Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule in U.C.C. 2-607 (3)(a) by Reitz, John C.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 73
Issue 3 March 1988 Article 2
Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice
of Claims Rule in U.C.C. 2-607 (3)(a)
John C. Reitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Reitz, Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule in U.C.C. 2-607 (3)(a) , 73 Cornell L. Rev. 534 (1988)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol73/iss3/2
AGAINST NOTICE: A PROPOSAL TO
RESTRICT THE NOTICE OF CLAIMS RULE
IN U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a)
John C. Reitz t
Under section 2-607(3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
buyer who has accepted goods loses all remedy for a breach with
respect to the goods if the buyer does not give the seller notice
"within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discov-
ered [the] breach."' The rule appears fair in that it requires the
buyer to give notice only within a "reasonable" time. The penalty
the rule imposes on the buyer that fails to act "reasonably," how-
ever, is harsh: the loss of all remedies even though the seller has in
fact breached.2
The rule is not an ancient feature of our law of sales. Professor
Samuel Williston introduced the rule into our law in section 49 of
his 1906 draft of the Uniform Sales Act,3 in part drawing his inspira-
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sons, Christopher and Benjamin, and this Article is dedicated to them.
1 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977) provides in full:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy...
2 Appellate courts have applied the notice rule to overturn large verdicts for buy-
ers. See, e.g., K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982)
(reversing trial judge's verdict of $1.5 million); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Claw-
son Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978) (reversing $0.5 million jury verdict), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th
Cir. 1976) (reversing $24.5 million jury verdict). Under the version of the notice rule
advocated in this Article, reversal on the basis of the notice rule would not have been
proper at least in the latter two cases and even in K & M the buyer should have been
able to recover some of its damages. See infra notes 32, 101 & 104.
3 Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act stated in relevant part:
But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to the
seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time
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tion from a provision in the German Commercial Code. 4 The com-
mon law still does not recognize such a rule,5 and the rule does not
after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall
not be liable therefor.
UNIF. SALES ACr § 49 (1906), reprinted in S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF
GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 484, at 846 (1909).
4 Section 377 of the German Commercial Code (the Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB)
provides as follows:
(1) If the sale is for both parties a commercial transaction, the buyer
must, insofar as it can be done in accordance with orderly business proce-
dures, inspect the goods immediately after delivery by the seller and if a
defect is apparent, immediately bring the defect to the notice of the
seller.
(2) If the buyer fails to give notice, the goods are deemed to be ap-
proved unless a defect is involved which could not have been discovered
by inspection.
(3) If such a defect is later discovered, the notice must be given immedi-
ately after the discovery; otherwise the goods are deemed to be approved
also in respect to this defect.
(4) Timely sending of the notice suffices to preserve the buyer's rights.
(5) If the seller concealed the defect in bad faith, he cannot rely on
these provisions.
HGB § 377 (1897) (author's translation). This provision has remained unchanged since
the adoption of the Code in 1897. P. RAISCH, GESCHICHTLICHE VORAUSSETZUNGEN,
DOGMATISCHE GRUNDLAGEN UND SINNWANDLUNG DES HANDELSRECHTS 288 (1965).
Professor Williston cited this provision of the German Commercial Code but did
not quote it in his treatise. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 494, at 864 n.73. In draft-
ing his own version of the notice rule, Williston broadened the rule significantly by mak-
ing it applicable to all buyers, not just merchants and to all breaches, not just defects.
5 Although the first Restatement of Contracts incorporated the notice rule, RE-
STATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 412 (1932), the second Restatement dropped it without ex-
planation in the Reporter's Notes. Because Professor Williston was the reporter for the
first Restatement it is possible that the Restatement temporarily adopted the rule be-
cause of his influence.
In general, "the courts have thus far been reluctant to transplant the Article 2 no-
tice defense." Clark, The First Line of Defense in Warranty Suits: Failure to Give Notice of
Breach, 15 U.C.C. LJ. 105, 117 (1982). It is settled, for example, that the notice rule
does not apply to a buyer's strict liability cause of action against a manufacturer for
defective products. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d
897, 899-900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699-700 (1963); DiPangrazio v. Salamonsen, 64 Wash.
2d 720, 723, 393 P.2d 936, 937-38 (1964); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.
2d 645, 647, 314 P.2d 421, 422 (1957). But see Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict
Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Diference?, 47 IND. LJ. 457, 469 (1972) (arguing that
sales law notice rule should apply to tort claims for product defects).
Nor have the courts been willing to apply the rule generally to non-Article 2 con-
tracts. See, e.g., Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wiggins Scale Co., 144 Ga. App. 145, 240
S.E.2d 323 (1977) (refusing to apply notice rule to contract for sale and installation of
truck scale because damages allegedly arose out of construction of pit and installation of
scale-services portion of the contract-and not out of any defect in the good itself);
Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 NJ. 585, 593, 190 A.2d 369, 373 (1963) (no re-
quirement to give notice of contractor's breach in absence of clause in contract requir-
ing such notice); Friedlander v. Gross, 63 NJ. Super. 470, 474, 164 A.2d 761, 763-64
(1960) (same).
Some courts have applied the section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule by analogy to a few
cases outside the scope of Article 2. For example, a bare majority of courts has held that
a real estate purchaser's right to sue for breach of the warranty of habitability is condi-
tioned on timely notice. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380,
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govern buyers' other Article 2 remedies of rejection and revocation 6
because, for reasons that do not apply to the damages remedy, they
are subject to shorter cut-off rules. 7 This Article asks why the "un-
525 P.2d 88, 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 652 (1974); Wagner Construction Co. v. Noonan,
403 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (builder-vendor not liable for breach of implied
warranty of habitability unless first given notice and opportunity to repair); Kirk v. Ridg-
way, 373 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 1985). But see Arst v. Max Barken, Inc. 655 S.W.2d
845, 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (giving seller notice and opportunity to repair are not
prerequisites to homeowner's right to damages for breach of warranty of habitability);
Lacey v. Edgewood Home Builders, Inc., 446 A.2d 1017, 1020 (R.I. 1982) (declining to
extend U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) by analogy to sale of real estate); cf Parsons v. Beaulieu,
429 A.2d 214, 218 (Me. 1981) (notice issue not yet decided in Maine); Crowder v.
Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (dictum stating that it would
be "desirable" to give sellers notice of breach and opportunity to repair), overruled on
other grounds by Sharp Bros. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo.
1986) (en banc).
Similarly, courts have applied the notice rule to leases of real estate. Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Henderson v. W.C. Haas Realty Management, 561
S.W.2d 382, 387-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 467, 308
A.2d 17, 22 (1973); see also Boehck Constr. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, 19 Wis. 2d
658, 121 N.W.2d 303 (1963) (extending notice rule to claims for breach of lease of
personal property). But see U.C.C. § 2A-502 (proposed draft 1986) (proposed Article 2A
on personal property leasing expressly rejects a statutory notice rule but sanctions con-
tractual notice rules).
6 Although section 2-607(3)(a) literally purports to bar "any remedy," other notice
rules govern the special remedies of rejection and revocation. Both rights are lost if
they are not exercised within a "reasonable" time.
The notice rule of section 2-607 would also apply to cut off the buyer's rights under
§ 2-716 to an award of the specific performance of repair. Although few cases applying
the notice rule to specific performance cases are likely to arise because the remedy of
damages will usually be adequate, see generally E. FARNSWORTH, CoNRrAcrs § 12.6 (1982),
the analysis of the appropriate functions and interpretation of the notice rule are the
same for damages claims and claims for specific performance.
The section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule is harsher than the other two because the buyer
that has lost the right to reject or to revoke may still have a right to money damages, but
the buyer that has failed to comply with the section 2-607 notice rule has no remedy left
at all.
7 Commentators have justified loss of the special remedies of rejection or revoca-
tion through untimely action on the grounds that delay in exercise of those rights might
prejudice the seller who, as a result of the exercise of those rights, must take back goods
and find a different way to dispose of them. For example, loss of opportunities to dis-
pose of the returned goods or a disadvantageous shift in the market price of the goods
may prejudice the seller. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3, at 309, § 11-10, at 426 (2d ed. 1980); see also Priest,
Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 984 (1978) (arguing that courts should and
in fact do interpret "reasonable time" limitation on buyer's right to reject or revoke
acceptance "by balancing the cost to the buyer of discovering the defect with the cost to
the seller of delay in discovery, typically depreciation of the goods prior to rejection or
revocation"). However, Professor Priest also suggests that a principled distinction be-
tween the "reasonable time" limitation on notice of rejection or revocation and the simi-
lar-sounding limitation on notice of claims cannot be maintained. Id. at 976. This
position does not account for the differences in the rights cut off by the various notice
rules.
Allowing a dilatory buyer to return goods also may raise difficult problems of how
and under what circumstances to require the buyer to account for the value of tempo-
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reasonably" dilatory commercial8 buyer of goods should be penal-
rary possession of the goods. If the buyer is to have the option to undo a transaction
that has resulted in transfer of possession and ownership, it is much simpler if the buyer
is forced to exercise that option quickly. Third party rights exacerbate the problem. For
example, what are the rights of a buyer's creditors who hold Article 9 floating liens that
attached to the goods upon the buyer's acceptance, U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c), if the buyer
subsequently revokes?
Finally, it is not so troubling that the special remedies of rejection and revocation,
which have the potential to work unfair hardship on the seller, be governed by short cut-
off rules because, even if the buyer fails to act fast enough to preserve its right to these
special remedies, it will still have an opportunity to protect its expectation interest
through the remedy of damages. None of these factors can justify the penalty that the
section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule imposes when the buyer keeps the goods and seeks to
vindicate its expectation interest only through money damages.
The official comments to section 2-608 indicate that the time period for giving no-
tice of revocation of acceptance should normally be longer than the time period for
giving notice of damage claims: "Since this remedy [revocation of acceptance] will be
generally resorted to only after attempts at adjustment have failed, the reasonable time
period should extend in most cases beyond the time in which notification of breach must
be given .. " U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 4. This comment confuses the sequence in
which it may be desirable that the buyer consider its various remedies with the policy
reasons that are advanced to justify the two different notice rules. The comment also
ignores the plain language of section 2-607(3)(a) ("or be barred from any remedy").
8 The focus will be on the commercial buyer and seller because the rule has always
been thought to be most soundly justified in the business setting. At least one court has
flatly held the notice rule to be inapplicable to consumers. Fischer v. Mead Johnson
Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). Only two
states have restricted the notice rule's application by amendments. One has amended
section 2-607(3) (a) to exclude consumer goods from its scope. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2-607(7) (Supp. 1986). The other has statutorily eliminated the notice rule in all
cases of personal injury, which would comprehend a large portion of consumer claims.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36.2-607(3) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
In addition, federal consumer protection legislation, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), which applies to all cases in which sellers of con-
sumer goods provide written warranties to their buyers, overrides section 2-607(3)(a)
but permits a seller to impose a notice requirement on a consumer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2304(b)(1); see Mendelson v. General Motors Corp, 105 Misc. 2d 346, 432 N.Y.S.2d
132, 136-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 81 A.D.2d 831, 441 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981).
The official comments to Article 2 invite the courts to treat consumer buyers much
more leniently than business buyers in determining how quickly notice must be given,
U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (" 'reasonable time' for notification from a retail consumer is
to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended"), and the
courts have done so. See Clark, supra note 5, at 115-17 nn. 33-38, 131-33 nn. 92-99
(citing cases). Thus, while courts typically interpret the notice rule to require the busi-
ness buyer to give notice in substantially less than a year, see infra note 67, some courts
dealing with consumer buyers have refused to find notice periods almost as long as the
four-year limitations period of U.C.C. § 2-725 untimely as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 351, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1089 (1978)
(almost 4 years); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 136, 273 S.E.2d 681, 684
(1981) (3 years).
As Professor Clark points out, the consumer who sues for breach will usually have a
parallel strict liability tort suit untrammeled by the rule, see infra note 118, and therefore
"[tihe really significant Section 2-607 cases are those involving substantial economic
loss suffered by a commercial buyer of defective equipment .. " Clark, supra note 5, at
116.
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ized further by complete loss of the damages remedy.
In other areas of the law, notice requirements are standard
tools for providing a minimum standard of fairness. 9 Why should
fairness not also justify a notice requirement when a buyer seeks to
hold a seller liable for breach damages? The costs of complying
with the rule cannot be large'0 In fact, giving prompt notice usually
serves the buyers' interests."I Nevertheless, the rule does impose at
least minor costs on all buyers' 2 and complete forfeiture on the buy-
ers who run afoul of it. Enforcement of the rule creates the same
9 One of the most striking uses of a notice requirement is its use to protect the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). When a governmental body takes adverse action against an individual's interest
that is protected by due process, "[t]he minimum requirements of due process are no-
tice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Transco
Security, Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981)
(citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970)). The Administrative Procedure
Act similarly prescribes notice to all affected parties for both rulemaking, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (1982), and adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982), and the "notice pleading"
and discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to ensure that a
party receives adequate notice of the claims against it. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 60 (1969). The breaching seller is of course
protected by the notice requirements imposed by the rules of civil procedure when suit
is brought against him. The notice rule is another layer of protection.
10 In general, compliance will cause the buyer to incur costs to inspect-but only to
make a "reasonable" inspection-and to report to the seller.
11 Unreasonable delay in giving notice-that is, delay for which the buyer cannot
offer a justification based on the reasonable commercial exigencies of its business-may
harm the buyer with a valid breach claim in a number of ways. For example, it may
result in delaying eventual payment by the seller, or worse, losing a claim against the
seller that becomes judgment proof, and it may undermine the credibility of the buyer's
evidence of the alleged breach. For further discussion of this point, see infra Section
II.B.2.
Delay in payment may in effect result in an interest-free loan to the seller. Under
typical rules against the recovery of prejudgment interest for "unliquidated" claims, the
buyer who delays in presenting a meritorious claim the amount of which cannot be de-
termined exactly without a trial will not be able to recover the time value of the claim
during that delay. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5, at
165 (1973). Most claims for a seller's breach in cases in which the goods are actually
delivered involve "unliquidated" claims, though courts may increasingly treat them as
falling into the category of claims in which the amount in dispute is "ascertainable" and
for which the courts will make an exception to the rule against prejudgment interest. Id.
at 165-66.
Even in states that allow the buyer to recover prejudgment interest on unliquidated
claims as a cost of breach, the buyer who unreasonably delays in notifying the seller of
the claim may be barred by the mitigation doctrine from recovering the time-value of
money during the period of unreasonable delay if it appears that the seller would have
made prompt payment had it been notified in a timely fashion.
12 First, there is the obvious risk that the courts, judging the matter by hindsight,
will disagree with the buyer's judgment about the steps necessary to insure that notice
will be given in a reasonable time. Second, as many of the case reports teach, the buyer
must consider that his own personnel will fail to act diligently in defense of the buyer's
interests. See, e.g., EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (buyer's personnel let huge casting sit in field for approximately 60 days after
delivery before noticing obvious nonconformity).
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opportunity for "gamesmanship" that is troubling about the strict
enforcement of other contractual conditions.13 The rule operates,
at least in some cases, as nothing more than a "booby-trap for un-
wary buyers" 14 and a naked preference for sellers. Unless there are
policies that strongly justify the notice rule, it may be expected to
have at least modestly negative economic consequences15 and, more
importantly, a corrosive effect on public respect for law. 16
13 Cf Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1970)
(criticizing as promoting "gamesmanship" the decision in Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling
Co., 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962), which affirmed the dismissal of an employee's suit,
filed 12 days after his allegedly improper discharge, on the grounds that the employee
failed to fulfill the express contractual conditions of (1) giving written notice within 30
days after the claim arose and (2) refraining from filing suit until 6 months after the
notice was given).
14 Several writers have characterized the notice rule, not always disapprovingly, as a
type of trap. See Clark, supra note 5, at 105 ("For the seller, failure of the buyer to give
notice is perhaps the first line of defense; for the buyer, it can be a thunderbolt out of
the sky."); id. at 106 ("case law suggests that many buyers have no real awareness of how
failure to give notice of breach can bar any remedy"); Leete, The Notice Booby-Trap of
U.C.C. Section 2-607(3)(a), 22 AM. Bus. LJ. 109 (1984); Note, Commercial Law-Maybank
v. S.S. Kresge: Reasonable Notice Requirement: A "Booby-Trap"for the Personally Injured Con-
sumer, 61 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1982) (authored by Jacqueline Riley Clare) (criticizing the
North Carolina Supreme Court for holding that injured consumer fulfilled notice re-
quirement by filing suit 3 years after purchase of defective flash-cubes). Those arguing
that the rule should not bar the rights of injured consumers clearly have considered the
trap-like quality of the notice rule a major reason not to apply it to consumers' tort
causes of action. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, LAW OF TORTS § 97,
at 691 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON] ("As applied to personal injuries, and
notice to a remote seller, [the notice rule] becomes a booby-trap for the unwary.");
James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 192, 197 (1955) (notice rule "may prove a trap"
to the consumer injured by a defective product). The courts picked up the "booby-trap"
label in holding that the notice rule does not apply to a tort cause of action for products
liability. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
15 The immediate effect of barring a valid claim against a seller is to force the buyer
to bear the full cost of the seller's breach. At least to the extent that the seller is not
subject to competition, the notice rule will thus shield a poorly performing seller from
some of the costs of its poor performance. Even in competitive markets, it does not
appear that buyers bargain to eliminate the notice rule. See infra note 146. Shifting
those costs to buyers can only be justified if the rule shields sellers or society from other
costs of a substantially greater magnitude.
It might be argued that the buyers' apparent disinclination to contract out of the
rule indicates satisfaction with the rule, but it may just as well indicate a belief that the
negative impact of the rule is too minor to worry about or that they are not free to
contract out of it. Id. This Article argues that buyers should not be satisfied with the
rule and should at least be free to contract out of it. Even if the notice rule is merely
suppletory, inclusion of a notice rule in the Code may skew perceptions of the rule be-
cause parties may assume it is the "fairest" rule. Moreover, even if suppletory, inclusion
in the Code forces buyers to expend negotiation capital to eliminate it rather than put-
ting the burden on sellers to bargain for the advantage of the rule.
16 See S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 28-29 (2d ed.
1982) ("[P]eople generally expect legal standards to be reasonable. Laws and decisions
that depart too far from this common expectation create enforcement problems and the
danger of a spreading disrespect for law.").
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Professor Williston's chief justification for including the notice
rule in the Uniform Sales Act was the ratification argument: if the
buyer keeps the goods for a considerable period of time without
complaining, it is reasonable to presume either that the goods com-
ply with contract requirements or that the buyer is willing to accept
the goods delivered instead of conforming goods.' 7 In most cases
this kind of estoppel-by-silence argument so clearly fails to justify
cutting off buyers' claims' 8 that few courts have adopted the expla-
nation,' 9 and it consequently has been totally abandoned.
Today courts and commentators justify the bar of the section 2-
607(3)(a) notice rule on the grounds that it prevents commercial
bad faith,20 promotes mitigation and cure,2 1 enables the seller to
17 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 488, at 851-52.
18 Williston's explanation may be plausible in some cases, but in many cases it
seems equally plausible that the buyer who fails to make a complaint has no intention of
relinquishing any rights, especially if the buyer has not yet paid the entire purchase
price. Of course, it is entirely implausible to suppose that the buyer who has not yet
discovered the breach intends to accept less than full performance or its equivalent in
damages. Even in cases in which the inference seems warranted, the fact that the buyer
had at one time intended not to seek any damages does not explain why the buyer
should not be able to change his mind later, especially if the damages have turned out to
be greater than they at first appeared.
As a legal doctrine, the ratification or modification-by-silence argument is a variant
of estoppel. Estoppel generally protects one party's reasonable reliance based on an-
other party's behavior. Ratification further protects reliance interests by relieving the
relying party of the risk that it might not be able to prove reliance. The justice of pro-
tecting "reasonable" reliance interests is powerfully appealing, but the estoppel doc-
trine provides no way of identifying which reliance is "reasonable." Why should it be
regarded as reasonable for the seller to rely on the inference of satisfaction that might
be thought to arise from the buyer's prolonged silence, especially when the psychologi-
cal truth of the inference is so patently questionable? Ajustificatory argument employ-
ing the estoppel doctrine only raises the question why the protected party's reliance
should be protected. As Professor Gilmore so memorably put it, estoppel is "simply a
way of saying that, for reasons which the court does not care to discuss, there must be
judgment for plaintiff." G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT 64 (1974). Application
of estoppel-like arguments may be soundly justified in a given case, but the justification
has to be sought outside the doctrine, in an argument that protecting the reliance inter-
ests in question will advance specific policy goals.
Of course, if the buyer represents to the seller by express statement or conduct that
he will not seek damages, application of estoppel or ratification might seem justified to
avoid injustice in the particular case. But in general, neither estoppel nor ratification
alone can provide a satisfactory justification for treating the buyer's silence as the
equivalent of a representation that the buyer will not seek to enforce a damage claim for
breach of contract.
19 There do not appear to be any early cases stating the ratification argument for
the notice rule. Most of the cases on notice decided prior to about 1930 are character-
ized by a complete lack of any discussion of the policy behind the rule. Starting in about
the 1930s cases concerned with the notice rule begin to include a policy-based analysis.
In this period, there are a few cases stating the ratification argument. See, e.g., Idzykow-
ski v. Jordan Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 167, 181 N.E. 172, 173 (1932) (notice rule
requires "such a notice as to repel the inference of waiver").
20 K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1114 (6th Cir. 1982)
("The underpinning of U.C.C. § 2-607 is a requirement of commercial good faith
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collect evidence while still fresh,22 and promotes settlement. 23 Ex-
cept for the settlement rationale, these arguments address various
kinds of prejudice to the seller.24 A less widely adopted non-
.... "); see U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 ("the rule of requiring notification is designed to
defeat commercial bad faith"); Phillips, supra note 5, at 469 (notice rule to prevent
"trumped-up claims, bad faith concealment and destruction of evidence"); Note, Notifi-
cation of Breach under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-607(3)(a): A Conflict, A Resolution, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 525, 540 (1985) (authored by George Frank Hammond) (encourage-
ment of good faith is one of five goals underlying broad fairness notion embodied in
section 2-607(3)(a)).
21 City of Marshall v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 650 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir.
1981) (notice rule encourages cure); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 134,
273 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1981) (most important policy behind notice rule is encouragement
of cure by seller).
Like the cases, most of the commentators have emphasized the protection of the
opportunity to cure as an important policy justification for the notice rule. J. WHrrE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 421 ("most important reason for requiring notice
is to enable the seller to make adjustments or replacements or to suggest opportunities
for cure to the end of minimizing the buyer's loss and reducing the seller's own liability
to the buyer"); Note, supra note 20, at 541 (to give seller opportunity to cure); Note,
Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 520, 522 (1973) (au-
thored by Marvin Chavis) (cure). Professor Clark is the only one who mentions mitiga-
tion in connection with cure, but he does not spell out the connection: "[another] policy
[behind the notice rule] is to enable the seller to make adjustments in manufacturing
defect cases; this is a variation of the mitigation theme. To put the matter another way,
notice gives the seller a reasonable opportunity to cure." Clark, supra note 5, at 110-11.
22 Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 972 (5th Cir.
1976); seeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 422; Clark, supra note 5, at
111; Phillips, supra note 5, at 466-68; Note, supra note 20, at 541; Note, supra note 21, at
522; Note, Section 2-607(3)(a): Effective Notification of Breach under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 733,. 737 (1983) (authored by Patrick A. Milberger).
23 TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 360 (5th Cir. 1980)
(notice must encourage settlement); see U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (notice should
"open[] the way for normal settlement through negotiation"); Clark, supra note 5, at 110
(narrowing the policy to encouragement ofpre-litigation settlement); see also Phillips, supra
note 5, at 468-69; Note, supra note 20, at 541; Note, supra note 21, at 524; Note, supra
note 22, at 737.
24 The Sixth Circuit has captured this basic duality of the various rationales for the
rule:
Notice of breach serves two distinct purposes. First, express notice opens
the way for settlement through negotiation between the parties.... Sec-
ond, proper notice minimizes the possibility of prejudice to the seller by
giving him "ample opportunity to cure the defect, inspect the goods, in-
vestigate the claim or do whatever may be necessary to properly defend
himself or minimize his damages while the facts are fresh in the minds of
the parties."
Standard Alliance Indust., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 1978)
(quoting Note, supra note 21, at 522), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
Because the concept of good faith is not necessarily limited to the prevention of
specific harm or the promotion of settlement the policy of preventing bad faith might be
thought to add a new element. The good faith obligation relevant to the section notice
provision, however, concerns only the duty of "good faith in... enforcement [of con-
tracts]," set forth in section 1-203 of the Code. That obligation was apparently intended
to include the mitigation principle. See U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1; Braucher, The Legis-
lative History of the Unform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 813-14 (1958). It
seems fair to suppose that prevention of other kinds of prejudice to the seller may be
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prejudice-based argument for the notice rule is that it provides what
Professors White and Summers colorfully refer to as "mind balm,"
the same repose that the statute of limitations provides.2 5 Courts
and commentators generally agree on the validity of the prejudice-
based justifications, but do not agree on the validity of the non-
prejudice rationales: the settlement26 and repose rationales.2 7
comprehended within the concept of the good faith enforcement obligation. It might
possibly encompass promotion of settlement, were the notice rule an apt instrument to
promote that policy.
The concept of good faith in enforcement does not, however, appear to add any
specific functional arguments for the notice rule to the catalogue of arguments set out in
the text. With a single exception, none of the authorities suggesting that good faith
provides a basis for the notice rule has discussed what the term means in this context. A
recent student note states that good faith requires that "the buyer must not act in a
manner which leads the seller to believe that the contract has been properly performed
when the buyer actually intends to institute a lawsuit." Note, supra note 20, at 544. The
suggestion amounts to the ratification theory in new garb, and it is just as incomplete a
justification when linked to the concept of good faith as when it stands alone. See supra
note 18. The assertion that the buyer has a duty to dispel the seller's belief that the
buyer will not sue merely raises the question why the duty should be imposed on the
buyer. If the rule does not protect the seller from prejudice or further some other pol-
icy, then it does not appear justified.
25 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 422 (repose is a "less important
policy behind the notice requirement"); see Clark, supra note 5, at 111; Note, supra note
20, at 541; see also Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th
Cir. 1978) (applying Ohio law), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Speakman Co. v.
Harper Buffing Machine Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Del. 1984); EPN-Delaval, S.A. v.
Inter-Equip, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 238, 249 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (quotingJ. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 421-22); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 686
P.2d 589, 591 (Wyo. 1984).
26 There do not appear to be any authorities expressly rejecting the settlement ar-
gument for the rule, but its absence from the list of policy justifications advanced by
some courts is notable. For example, the widely quoted catalogue of policy reasons
advanced by the Colorado Supreme Court is confined to prejudice arguments:
First, notice provides the seller a chance to correct any defect. Second,
notice affords the seller an opportunity to prepare for negotiation and
litigation. Third, notice provides the seller a safeguard against stale
claims being asserted after it is too late for the manufacturer or seller to
investigate them.
Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Colo. 1980) (citations omitted); cf J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, note 7, § 11-10, at 421-23 (advancing prejudice and repose
arguments for rule).
27 In stating the policy goals for the notice rule, most authorities omit repose
though a few courts and commentators have advanced the argument. See supra note 25.
A few courts have rejected the argument expressly. See, e.g., Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279
Md. 371, 377, 368 A.2d 993, 996 (1977) (rejecting argument that notice rule is to pro-
tect seller from "stale claims" because that is function of statute of limitations); Frericks
v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 316, 363 A.2d 460, 466 (1976) (same); cf Stan-
dard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 1978) (citingJ.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 9-6, at 344 for repose rationale, citing Mattos for
argument dismissing repose rationale, and then relying solely on prejudice justification
to justify application of notice rule bar even though evidence of prejudice was tenuous),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 135, 273
S.E.2d 681, 684 (1981) (repose argument "will rarely provide a reason for holding that
notice has not been seasonably given.").
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Moreover, while some claim the settlement rationale is an independ-
ent ground for the notice rule,28 no one has made that claim for the
repose argument.2 9
In view of the uncertain policy basis for the notice rule, it is not
surprising that considerable conflict exists over its proper applica-
tion. The rule's "reasonable time" standard obviously delegates
considerable discretion to the courts. With no clear and consistent
set of policies to guide their discretion, the courts have reached in-
consistent results on what a "reasonable time" is. s° Similarly, the
courts are divided over such issues as what kind of notice the rule
requires, 31 whether the notice requirement applies to delay
28 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 112 (if the seller cannot show prejudice, "the
seller could argue that one of the purposes behind Section 2-607(3)(a) is to encourage
prelitigation settlement of disputes, and that this purpose is always undercut if the buyer
gives no prior notice of breach"); Note, supra note 14, at 182 (criticizing Maybank v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981), which held that injured consumer's
filing of suit three years after explosion of flashcube satisfied notice rule, in part on
grounds that three-year delay frustrated settlement).
29 See authorities cited supra note 25. In suggesting how sellers' counsel should
argue a case in which the seller can show no prejudice, Professor Clark recommends
resort to the settlement rationale, see supra note 28, but does not mention the repose
argument even though he lists it as a justification for the rule.
30 Professors White and Summers call this issue "[t]he most vexatious and fre-
quently litigated 2-607(3)(a) question." J. WroTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10,
at 421; accord EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 238, 245 (S.D. Tex.
1982). The issue is particularly uncertain because it is generally treated as a question of
fact or a mixed question of fact and law, to be determined by the trier of fact. See, e.g.,
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (1 lth Cir.
1983) (fact); Carter Equipment Co. v.John Deere Indus. Equip., 681 F.2d 386, 396 (5th
Cir. 1982) (fact); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 970-73
(5th Cir. 1976) (usually question of fact; applying California law); Clark, supra note 5, at
135 (mixture of law and fact).
31 The courts are divided between a strict standard and a lenient standard for the
content of notice. The strict standard of notice requires that the buyer "either directly
or inferentially, inform the seller that the buyer demands damages upon an asserted
claim of breach of warranty." Cotner v. International Harvester Co., 260 Ark. 885, 889,
545 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1977); accord Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532
F.2d 957, 973 (5th Cir. 1976) (notice must inform seller "that the buyer considers him
to be in breach of the contract"; applying California law). The cases are collected and
discussed in Note, supra note 20, at 534-37 nn. 50-66. The strict standard has been
called the majority view. T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338,
360 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Note, supra note 20, at 536 n.65 ("strict standard may now be
the majority view").
The lenient standard is often said to "require a buyer to notify the seller that 'the
transaction is still troublesome and must be watched.'" Id. at 530 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-
607 comment 4). For a collection of cases using this standard, see id. at 530-34. This
standard appears to require only that the seller have knowledge of the factual circum-
stances sufficient to determine that the buyer has grounds for a claim of breach, though
most of the cases finding adequate notice also involve some form of complaint by the
buyer. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092,
1102 (11 th Cir. 1983) (complaints sufficient if they notified seller that the transaction
was troublesome); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509 (8th Cir. 1971) (buyer
told seller he was not sure whether oil supplied was appropriate for use in machine);
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claims, 32 whether notice can be given by pleadings or after suit has
commenced,33 and whether the notice rule applies to buyers' non-
Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 594-96 (8th Cir. 1964) (notice require-
ment satisfied by failure of helicopter in presence of seller's expert and by buyer's state-
ment that it was closing down operations because of inadequacies in the helicopter);
City Welding & Mfg. Co. v. Gidley-Eschenheimer Corp., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373-74,
451 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1983) (complaints provided notice of defects even though unac-
companied by express assertion of legal rights).
The Code is remarkably ambiguous on this point. Section 2-607(3)(a) states that
the buyer must "notify the seller of breach." This phrase could be taken to require
notice of thefact of breach or of the buyer's opinion that the seller has breached. If notice
of only facts is involved, the detailed definition of "notice" in the Code suggests that the
seller's actual knowledge should satisfy the requirement. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) ("A
person has 'notice' of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or... (c) ... he has
reason to know that it exists."). If notice of the buyer's opinion is involved, the liberal
definition of notice of facts in section 1-201(25) is not literally applicable. Both camps
find support in the official comment. Compare U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 ("[t]he content
of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is
still troublesome and must be watched") with id (statement that required notice must
"inform[] the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach").
32 The majority view, by an overwhelming margin, is that the notice rule applies to
claims for late delivery. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134,
152 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Ohio law); Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
532 F.2d 957, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying California law); Nederlandse
Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 851
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); In re First Hartford Corp., 63 Bankr. 479,
487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611
P.2d 507, 510-11 n.8 (Alaska 1980). Only one case has been found to the contrary. Jay
V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
33 The majority of courts hold that the pleadings or other papers filed in the course
of a lawsuit cannot constitute notice, and many of these courts apparently take the posi-
tion that notice comes too late if it is not given prior to filing suit. For example, in Lynx,
Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502 (1974), the Maryland Supreme
Court rejected the argument that an answer to a summary judgment motion, filed 8
months after the earliest and 3 months after the latest deliveries of the goods at issue,
could fulfill the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a). The court reasoned,
Since the existence of a right of action is conditioned upon whether noti-
fication has been given the seller by the buyer, where no notice has been
given prior to the institution of the action an essential condition prece-
dent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyer-plaintiff
has lost the right of his "remedy." Thus the institution of an action by
the buyer to recover damages cannot by itself be regarded as a notice of
the breach contemplated under [section 2-607(3)(a)].
273 Md. at 17, 327 A.2d at 514; accord 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:28 (2d ed. 1971).
Other courts justify this interpretation of the rule as serving the policy goal of en-
couraging settlement. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611
P.2d 507, 512 (Alaska 1980); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 614, 615 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
At least where consumers are involved, pleadings may constitute adequate notice if
timely filed. Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 462-63 (Alaska 1983); Owens v.
Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D. Il. 1984); cf. Hampton v. Gebhardt's
Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1961) ("notice otherwise given within a
reasonable period of time can .. follow commencement of suit provided it is subse-
quently and properly pleaded"); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 274, 560
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privity warranty suits against remote sellers. 34
The courts have also divided on a deeper level. On the one
hand, certain jurisdictions view the notice rule as a narrowly drawn
cut-off rule, like the equitable doctrine of laches, which cuts off
claims only if the defendant can show prejudice.35 The courts in
these jurisdictions tend to treat the absence of a showing of preju-
P.2d 789, 792 (1977) (dictum; pleadings may fulfill notice requirement, but reasonable-
ness is assessed in light of circumstance of case).
34 Authority is fairly evenly split on this issue. For a detailed discussion of many of
the cases, see Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106,452 A.2d 192
(1982) (notice requirement not applied to remote seller), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d
930 (1983); Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979). Another case adheres to the general rule that no notice need be given to remote
sellers, but creates an exception in the case of a buyer-farmer who, prior to the problems
that arose from the defective herbicide, had worked closely with the remote manufac-
turer and was even paid to promote the herbicide in his area. Carson v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 635 P.2d 1248 (1981).
Most of the cases holding that there is no duty to notify remote sellers are based on
the assumption that a buyer's immediate seller will notify its seller upon receiving notice
from buyer, thus extending notice up the chain of distribution. They therefore explicitly
recognize that the remote seller may raise as a defense buyer's failure to give timely
notice to its immediate seller. E.g., Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656
(N.D. Ala. 1984) (applying Alabama law); Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp.
32, 36 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (applying Illinois law); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187,
206 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 347-48, 378
N.E.2d 1083, 1086-87 (1978).
Several courts have held that the notice rule does apply to a warranty cause of ac-
tion against a remote seller. See, e.g., Gross v. Systems Eng'g Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 42 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania law); Shooshanian v. Wag-
ner, 672 P.2d 455, 462-63 (Alaska 1983); Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 379
N.E.2d 7 (1978); Parrillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313, 1317 (R.I. 1981); Western
Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).
See also Clark, supra note 5, at 126-28 (arguing that buyer suing remote seller should
have to give notice to remote seller); Leete, supra note 14, at 123 (buyer should only
have to notify immediate seller); Comment, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the
UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice
Requirement in the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 873, 899-902 (1986) (authored by
Arlie R. Nogan) (buyer should be required to take reasonable steps to give notice to
remote sellers). This Article does not attempt to resolve this issue because it depends
on the strength of the policies to be served by recognizing nonprivity contract actions,
not on the purposes of the notice rule, which would appear to apply just as well to
nonprivity sellers as to those in privity.
35 See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) ("Laches requires
proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2)
prejudice to the party asserting the defense."); Ecology Center v. Coleman, 515 F.2d
860, 867 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring defendant to show "a delay in asserting a right or
claim, that the delay was not excusable and that there was undue prejudice to the party
against whom the claim is asserted").
Only a few authorities have dealt expressly with the notice rule as a "laches" de-
fense. See, e.g., Kull v. General Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 166 A. 562 (1933) (treat-
ing notice rule in section 49 of Uniform Sales Act as a "laches" defense). But see Phillips,
supra note 5, at 478 (rejecting that view of rule on grounds that "proof of prejudice may
often be impossible" and "establishing that the buyer was free of bad faith or waiver of
his rights in not giving early notice may be impossible"; therefore arguing "prejudice
should be assumed").
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dice as indicative that notice was given within a reasonable time.3 6
Most jurisdictions, however, view the rule as a broadly applicable
cut-off rule, like the statute of limitations, which applies in all cases.
This interpretation of the rule assumes that notice is justified in
enough cases to warrant applying it without justification in the indi-
vidual case.37 These jurisdictions apply the notice rule even if the
seller was not prejudiced by the buyer's delay in giving notice.3 8
This Article attempts to show that these controversies are
rooted in disagreement over the scope and strength of the com-
monly asserted justifications for the section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule.
While the notice rule has prompted periodic commentary, 39 no one
has critically questioned each of the asserted justifications to ascer-
36 See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298-99 (3d Cir.
1961) (consumer buyer); Schlottman v. Pressey, 195 F.2d 343, 346 (10th Cir. 1952)
(business buyer; under section 49 of Uniform Sales Act); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684
P.2d 187, 207 n.3 (Colo. 1984) (consumer buyer); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill.
App. 3d 344, 350, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1088 (1978) (consumer buyer); cf Orto v.Jackson,
413 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (buyer of house did not give notice within
reasonable time but suit not barred because it was clear from seller's actions that timely
notice would not have served policies thought to lie behind notice rule); Henrick v.
Coats Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 986, 977, 458 N.E.2d 773, 774-75 (1984) (requiring proof
of prejudice in accordance with Massachusetts's version of U.C.C. § 2-318).
This position may be more widely supported than it appears, however, because con-
siderable authority exists for the proposition that the courts should determine whether
the delay in giving notice is reasonable by reference to the policies said to be served by
the rule. See, e.g., Maybank v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 302 N.C. 129, 134, 273 S.E.2d 681, 684,
(1981); U.C.C. § 1-204(2) ("What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on
the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action."). See generally J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 421-26. This view of the notice rule in effect turns
the "reasonable time" standard into a rough kind of balance that takes into account the
obvious detriment of the cut-off to the buyer, at least in cases in which no purpose of the
notice rule appears to be served, but strikes the balance in favor of the seller whenever
application of the rule appears to further a policy thought to be served by the rule.
Under this view, those courts that focus exclusively on the prejudice-avoidance function
of the notice rule, see Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Colo. 1980); supra
note 26, should in effect require a showing of prejudice before they find that the buyer
did not give notice within a reasonable time. Courts that adopt the settlement rationale
for the notice rule may find that purpose fulfilled by application of the rule in cases
lacking demonstrable prejudice to the seller. See supra note 28.
37 But see Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitation, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 3, 33 (1986)
(by manipulating doctrines such as tolling, courts soften clear lines drawn by statutes of
limitation to avoid barring potentially meritorious claims).
38 See, e.g., Ashley v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 571, 574 (6th Cir.
1980) (there is "no authority" for proposition that a showing of prejudice is required;
applying Michigan law); Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1532 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (no prejudice need be shown); Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural
Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 511 (Alaska 1980) (judgment for buyer reversed, even though
trial judge expressly found that absence of notice did not prejudice seller, because "[o]n
its face the language of [section 2-6 0 7 (3)(a)] allows for no alternative to timely notice").
39 The U.C.C. notice rule has spawned the following specialized treatments in legal
journals from 1963 to 1985: Clark, supra note 5; Dillsaver, Notice of Breach After Acceptance
of Tender, 17 U.C.C. LJ. 220 (1985); Leete, supra note 14; Phillips, supra note 5; Note,
Notice Requirement in Warranty Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 586 (1963)
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tain the extent to which they individually or collectively justify the
rule. This Article undertakes to do so.
This Article argues that only two plausible justifications for the
notice rule exist and that each justifies a very different type of rule.
If one policy behind the rule is that it secures the benefits of a
shorter rule of repose,40 then a broadly applicable "limitations-
style" rule that applies without regard to whether the seller has in
fact suffered prejudice is justified. Generally, however, courts have
correctly rejected this policy basis because it conflicts with the Uni-
form Commercial Code's policy against short limitations periods.
The other possible justification for the notice rule is that it pro-
tects the seller from prejudice it might suffer as a result of the
buyer's delay in giving notice. This rationale, in one form or an-
other, has been the most commonly offered justification for the rule
throughout its eighty-year history in the United States.4 1 If the
(authored by Donald P. Newell); Note, supra note 20; Note, supra note 14; Note, supra
note 21; Note, supra note 22.
40 Courts in this country have largely rejected or ignored this justification. See supra
notes 27 & 29 and accompanying text.
Modem German scholarship, however, appears to have accepted the justification.
For example, one German contracts scholar recently summarized the policies behind the
notice rule in the German Commercial Code as follows:
The basic idea of this rule follows from the need for clarity and speedy
wrapping up of business which is typical for commercial transactions. Ra-
tio legis is the protection of the seller. He should learn as quickly as possi-
ble whether the delivery is "in order" or is objected to by the buyer so
that he can have a reliable basis for decisions about further business mat-
ters. In addition, he should be protected from difficulties of proof "in
which he is likely to find himself with the passage of time."
Marburger, Die Sachmngelhafiung beim Handelskauf, 23 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 1 (1983)
(footnotes omitted; author's translation). Because the German notice rule applies to all
remedies and there is no other special notice rule for the remedy of rejection, id. at 8,
10, it is difficult to know how much the German commitment to repose reflects the spe-
cial reasons for insisting of speed in the exercise of rejection and how much it reflects an
evaluation of the possible benefits of early repose for damage claims.
41 Since the notice rule first made its appearance in American law in section 49 of
the Uniform Sales Act, see supra note 3, the courts have viewed the rule as protecting
sellers, although the early cases did not specify the evils against which sellers needed
protection. See, e.g., Truslow & Fulle, Inc. v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181,
187, 151 A. 492, 495 (193Q) ("The purpose of the [notice rule] is clearly to give the
seller timely information that the buyer proposes to look to him for damages for the
breach, that the former may govern his conduct accordingly."); Idzykowski v. Jordan
Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 167, 181 N.E. 172, 173 (1932) (notice rule "is intended for
the protection of the seller against belated claims for damages"); Maggioros v. Edson
Bros., 164 N.Y.S. 377, 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917) (notice rule "is intended for the protec-
tion of the seller ... to give the seller an early notice of the alleged defects."); S. WIL-
LISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACr § 484a, at 1259 (2d ed. 1924) (retaining the ratification argument
but also adding the statement that the notice rule "avoids the hardship on the seller of
allowing a buyer at any time within the period of the Statute of Limitations to assert that
the goods are or were defective though no objection was made when they were re-
ceived"). As noted above, however, the style of court opinions in this early period of the
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types of potential prejudice were sufficiently pervasive, this rationale
alone would justify the "limitations-style" version of the rule. This
Article argues, however, that the buyer's delay in giving notice is
unlikely to prejudice the seller in many instances. Consequently,
this policy goal justifies at most a "laches-style" rule applicable only
if the seller can show that the delay in notice prejudiced it.
Parts I and II of this Article examine the strength and scope
each of the policy goals used to justify the notice rule. Part I consid-
ers the settlement and repose arguments for the rule. Part II ana-
lyzes the argument that the rule prevents prejudice to the seller.
Part III applies the conclusions of Parts I and II to specify the ways
that courts should apply both statutory and contractual notice rules.
Because the Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly
limit the courts from adopting this Article's conclusions, legislative
reform of the Code may not be required. However, in order to crys-
tallize the proposals in this Article, as well as to offer specific lan-
guage to clarify the current language of the statutory notice rule, the
appendix sets forth proposed amendments to the relevant Code sec-
tions and accompanying official comments.
notice rule did not generally include any examination of the policy bases for the rule.
See supra note 19.
In the 1930s and 1940s a few courts began to explain the notice rule, at least in part,
as protecting the seller against the loss of opportunity to gather exculpatory evidence
while it is still relatively fresh. Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d
91, 94 (3rd Cir. 1946) (prompt notice would have enabled bus manufacturer to gather
evidence to refute all or part of passengers' damage claims, thus, minimizing its liability
to bus company for claims paid to passengers injured in bus accident); Columbia Axle
Co. v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206, 207 (6th Cir. 1933) (one purpose of
notice rule is "to permit the seller to make inspection of the goods"; other purpose is to
give seller early warning of buyer's claims); Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, 88 N.H. 409,
412-13, 190 A. 280, 283 (1937) (analogizing notice rule in sales to notice rule for tort
claims against municipalities, purpose of which was to enable municipal officers to
gather evidence while fresh so that well-founded claims could be settled and false claims
resisted).
A few cases in the 1950s raised the possibility that the notice rule could be justified
as preserving the seller's opportunity to make a claim over against a manufacturer or
supplier. Owen v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 273 F.2d 140, 143 (9th Cir. 1959); Smith v.
Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103, 122 So. 2d 591: 593 (1960) ("One reason for
the notice requirement.., is to apprise the vendor that a claim will be made against him
and give him an opportunity to prepare a defense or notify his supplier.").
The first cases to view the notice rule as protecting the seller's interest in providing
cure appeared in the late 1960s. Wayne Tractor, Inc. v. Shields, 381 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1967) (purpose of notice requirement is to enable seller to "minimize any damages or
correct the defect"); L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 467, 438 S.W.2d
717, 720 (1969) ("The purpose of the statutory requirement of notice to the seller of
breach of warranty is to enable the seller to minimize damages in some manner, such as
correcting the defect, and also to give the seller some immunity against stale claims.").
For more recent cases and writers espousing prejudice arguments for the rule, see
supra notes 21-22.
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I
THE NONPREJUDICE-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR
THE NOTICE RULE
Williston's ratification argument for the notice rule could be
viewed as a type of nonprejudice rationale,42 but subsequent case
law suggests that the principal concern of the early cases was to pro-
tect the seller from prejudice.43 The distinct nonprejudice argu-
ments based on settlement 44 and repose4 5 were not articulated until
42 The ratification or estoppel-by-silence argument is an incomplete argument for
the notice rule. See supra note 18. It is consistent with both prejudice-based and non-
prejudice-based arguments. For example, like the repose argument, the ratification ar-
gument could be premised on the assumption that there is social utility in creating an
expectation that claims unasserted after a certain time period are barred. Or like the
prejudice-based arguments, the estoppel-by-silence argument could be justified on the
grounds that sellers are likely to rely to their detriment on buyers' apparent satisfaction.
The notice rule can be seen as protecting the seller against detrimental reliance, such as
loss of rebuttal evidence.
43 See supra note 41.
44 Professor Phillips appears to have first advanced the settlement argument in a
1971 law review article. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 468 ("Timely notice also serves the
purpose of settlement."). Although he asserted that both the Code and the cases recog-
nized this function of the notice rule, he cites as authority only the language from U.C.C.
§ 2-607 comment 4. I& at 468 n.44. His suggestion was echoed by a 1973 student note,
Note, supra note 21, at 524, and by a court in 1976. Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit wrote that "the purpose
of notice is ... to open the way for settlement through negotiation between the parties,"
but cited no authority for that specific statement. Id. at 972. Later in the same para-
graph, however, it cited both the Phillips article and the student note. Id.
45 The earliest statement of a repose argument for the rule that is clearly distin-
guished from prejudice arguments appeared in 1972 in Professors White and Sum-
mers's first edition of their U.C.C. treatise:
A final, and less important policy behind the notice requirement is to give
the defendant that same kind of mind balm he gets from the statute of
limitations. There is some value in allowing a seller, at some point, to
close his books on goods sold in the past and to pass on to other things.
J. WnrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 11-9, at 344 (1972). Professor Phillips touched on this rationale in his 1971
article when he wrote, "another recurring rationale for the notice requirement is that it
tends to prevent stale claims. This rationale implies more than the policy of repose
since it also encompasses knowing waiver, trumped-up claims, bad faith concealment
and destruction of evidence." Phillips, supra note 5, at 469 (footnote omitted). It ap-
pears, however, that he interpreted the policy against "stale claims" as primarily one of
combatting bad faith and fraud, not the promotion of repose for its own sake.
Like Professor Phillips's statement, the rule's earlier rationales that might be inter-
preted as repose arguments appear concerned with protecting the seller from prejudice,
especially from the loss of evidence. After setting forth the ratification argument for the
notice rule at some length in his 1909 treatise, S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 488, at 851-
53, Professor Williston concluded that "[t]he merits of [the notice rule in section 49 of
the Uniform Sales Act] are its certainty and the limitation of time for disputing the cor-
rectness of the seller's performance." Id. at 853. He gave no further explanation, how-
ever, for preferring an earlier cut-off than the applicable statute of limitations.
Some early cases applying section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act repeat the preference
for a rule of repose shorter than the applicable statute of limitations or characterize the
rule as cutting off "stale" claims. Given the emphasis on protecting the seller from
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the early 1970s. Ironically, the widely adopted settlement rationale
does not provide a sound basis for the notice rule, while the largely
ignored repose rationale might provide a plausible policy founda-
tion for the rule if it did not conflict with the Uniform Commercial
Code's policy against rules that provide quick repose.
A. Promotion of Settlement
The possibility of settlement is a concern in virtually all civil
lawsuits. Therefore, if delay in notice really does hinder settlement,
the rationale applies to every case. Because the argument appears
strong, it has been used to justify application of the notice rule in
cases in which no possibility of prejudice to the seller exists. 46 Ex-
amination of the argument shows, however, that it is based on ques-
tionable premises and policy judgments and should be abandoned
entirely as a basis for the notice rule.
The promotion-of-settlement justification for the notice rule
depends on the questionable premise that the sooner the parties be-
gin negotiations after breach, the greater the chances of settle-
ment.47 The premise is crucial to justifying the timeliness
requirement of the notice rule. Because the seller cannot enter into
settlement negotiations before it has notice of the buyer's claim, the
harm, however, see supra note 41, these cases should not be understood as subscribing to
the repose argument for the rule. The courts' only specific references during this early
period addressing the possibility of harm to the seller concerned a buyer that first raised
its damage claim as an offset to the seller's action for the price. It appears that the
courts' main concern was that the buyer's claims were likely to be fraudulent or at least
unfounded and that the delay would hinder the seller in mounting a proper defense.
For example, in Wildman Mfg. Co. v. Davenport Hosiery Mills, 147 Tenn. 551, 559, 249
S.W. 984, 986 (1923), the court stated that: "the purpose of [the notice rule] ... [is] to
prevent the buyer from interposing belated claims for damages (too often a mere after-
thought) as an offset to a suit begun by the seller for the purchase price." See also Regina
Co. v. Gately Furniture Co., 154 N.Y.S. 888, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd, 171 A.D.
817, 157 N.Y.S. 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (notice rule's purpose is to prevent buyer
from retaining and using goods without giving notice of breach until after seller has
sued for the purchase price.
Courts have continued to mention the policy of protecting the seller against "stale"
claims in conjunction with other policies. See, e.g., L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246
Ark. 463, 468, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969) ("The purpose of the statutory requirement
of notice to the seller of breach of warranty is to enable the seller to minimize damages
in some manner, such as correcting the defect, and also to give the seller some immunity
against stale claims.").
46 See supra note 28.
47 Another premise underlying the settlement argument is that it is good public
policy to promote settlement. Although settlements reduce the cost to the public of
providing formal adjudication, imposing limitations or burdens on civil parties' access to
tribunals of formal adjudication in order to channel parties into less formal proceedings
designed to promote settlement, such as mediation or arbitration, may tend to favor the
stronger parties and therefore produce settlements that are not "fair." See Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
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promotion-of-settlement argument justifies the timeliness require-
ment on the grounds that it promotes behavior by the buyer (giving
notice as soon as possible) that is most likely to achieve the desired
policy goal (resolution of disputes through negotiation and compro-
mise). A closely related premise, namely that settlement negotia-
tions started before litigation are more likely to result in settlement
than those started after the initiation of litigation, has apparently led
some courts to hold that pleadings cannot constitute notice and that
notice with or after the pleadings comes too late to satisfy the rule.48
Both premises appear to be unwarranted generalizations. The
Supreme Court of Alaska, in holding that pleadings could constitute
notice, expressly disagreed with the premise that the filing of a com-
plaint deters settlement:
The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the negotiation
and settlement of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of going
to trial is often a powerful incentive to a defendant to investigate
the claims against it and to arrive at a reasonable agreement. A
defendant may more easily and effectively prepare for either set-
tlement or trial when it may compel discovery and so determine
for itself the basis for a plaintiff's claims of liability.4 9
Similarly, no basis exists for believing that the mere passage of time
before a dispute begins will decrease the chances for settlement.50
48 See supra note 33.
49 Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 462-63 (Alaska 1983); cf McEwen &
Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 11, 45-46 (1984) (disputing parties tend not to choose mediation before
beginning court proceedings because weaker party sees initiating court proceedings as
way of gaining negotiation leverage).
The contrary position would appear to be bolstered by studies of "escalation" dur-
ing dispute processing. There is reason to believe that in any dispute, the action of
appealing to a third party generally involves an escalation of the conflict or a hardening
of positions. See generally VidmarJustice Motives and Other Psychological Factors in the Devel-
opment and Resolution of Disputes, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING
TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND CHANGE 395, 411-13 (M. Lerner & S. Lerner eds. 1981). It is
difficult to know how significant a barrier to settlement this effect is in commercial
litigation.
50 No empirical studies exist on the effect of delay in raising a claim on the likeli-
hood of settlement. The empirical studies that have been done on the significance of
timing on the settlement process, however, suggest that providing an end point to the
settlement process is far more likely to promote settlement than providing an early start-
ing point. SeeJ. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGO-
TIATION 120-24 (1975) (reviewing empirical studies and other sociological literature on
the "eleventh hour" effect). According to Professors Rubin and Brown, the empirical
studies "lend support to the general proposition that time pressures increase the likelihood of
agreement and tend to be manifested in reductions in bargaining aspirations, demands, and the
amount of bluffing that occurs." Id. at 123 (emphasis in original). They note that even in
cases in which the parties initiate bargaining far in advance of anticipated deadlines,
"agreement often fails to be reached until the final hour anyway." Id. at 121.
These studies suggest that a rule mandating an early trial date once a dispute has
begun would be far more effective in promoting prompt settlement than the notice rule.
1988]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
Passage of time may in fact enhance settlement opportunities. 51 Un-
less the seller suspects that it has been prejudiced, the buyer's delay
is not likely to affect the parties' evaluations of their respective
claims. 52
Even if the premises underlying the promotion-of-settlement
argument are sound, the notice rule is poorly designed to further
this policy goal. The notice requirement does not guarantee earlier
settlement negotiations. Intransigence on either side will effectively
frustrate settlement without sanction. Moreover, the cost, delay, ag-
gravation, and, most important of all, uncertainty of civil litigation
produce powerful incentives for commercial litigants to pursue
strategies that are likely to enhance settlement opportunities.53 If
early notice enhanced settlement possibilities, commercial buyers
would give early notice with or without a notice rule. Thus the no-
tice rule is an unnecessary additional incentive. It is objectionable,
moreover, because the penalty that the rule imposes on buyers is
disproportionate to the asserted social harm. At most, the buyer's
delay in giving notice may reduce the chances for settlement. For
that minor possibility of harm, the notice rule deprives the buyer of
all remedies. The rule is particularly objectionable in cases where
the seller has suffered no demonstrable prejudice because it results
in a windfall to the seller.
B. The Repose Argument
A second possible nonprejudice justification for the notice rule
is that it provides repose for sellers sooner than the one-to-four-
year limitations period applicable to Article 2 transactions.5 4 Few
However, other studies have suggested that disputants may actually prefer risking deci-
sion by a third party rather than compromising perceived rights in a settlement so that,
if processing time is shortened sufficiently, the rate of settlement declines. See Weller,
Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20
JUDGEs' J., Summer 1981, at 36, 39-41 (analyzing data from compulsory arbitration
plans in Rochester, New York, over ten-year period).
51 With time, the personnel on one or both sides of a contract dispute may change,
leaving new personnel without any personal stake in the outcome relatively more free to
achieve a settlement.
52 For example, if the seller suspects that the delay has prejudiced his ability to
gather evidence to defend against unfounded claims, the additional uncertainty may
widen the gap between the buyer's and the seller's assessment of the strength of the
claim. In that case, the settlement rationale is subsidiary to the argument based on pro-
tecting the seller's evidence-gathering ability and does not constitute an independent
ground for the notice rule.
53 As Professor Leff trenchantly observed in analyzing the factors that might lead a
creditor to agree to accept less than full payment of a valid claim, "Under the American
law of contracts, after the other party has fully performed his obligations, it is absolutely
irrational for you fully to perform yours." Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite--The Dynamics
of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1, 5 (1970) (footnote omitted).
54 U.C.C. § 2-725(1) provides, "An action for breach of any contract for sale must
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American authorities have advanced the repose argument,55 and
none have treated it as an independent rationale for the rule.56
Some courts have dismissed the argument on the grounds that pro-
viding repose is the function of the statute of limitations. 57
The repose argument for the notice rule is not necessarily
flawed just because the statute of limitations also provides repose.
The notice rule imposes a lesser burden on the buyer than the stat-
ute of limitations. Although the buyer can satisfy the notice rule
with a simple communication to the seller, compliance with the stat-
ute of limitations entails filing a lawsuit. Rules that encourage par-
ties to deliberate longer before suing than before complaining may
be preferable. Therefore, using the less burdensome notice rule to
secure the benefits of repose in a period shorter than would be ac-
ceptable in the form of a limitations rule is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the longer statute-of-limitations periods.58 It is therefore
necessary to consider the arguments in favor of a specifically short
rule of repose for buyers' claims.
As with notice rules, both prejudice and nonprejudice argu-
ments justify limitations rules. The prejudice argument will be dis-
cussed in the next section in connection with the prejudice
arguments for the notice rule. The principal nonprejudice argu-
ment is that repose facilitates planning by providing an endpoint to
the possibility of claims arising from a transaction.59
be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but
may not extend it."
55 See supra notes 25 & 27. Under German law, however, the argument appears to
provide significant support for the notice rule. See supra note 40.
56 See supra note 29.
57 See supra note 27.
58 One might argue that the notice rule is justified as a compromise between those
who believe that the limitations period is too long and those who believe it is not. In
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974), the Illinois Supreme
Court seemed to view the notice rule as that sort of compromise in the context of a
personal injury suit. The court rejected the argument that the notice rule only applies to
commercial transactions and therefore would not apply to a breach of warranty cause of
action for personal injury arising out of the sale of consumer goods. The court stated:
The acceptance of section 2-725(1) as the appropriate limitation period
for actions involving personal injuries predicated on Code liability sub-
stantially extends the filing period for such actions beyond the traditional
limitation period established by [the Illinois statute of limitations applica-
ble to tort causes of action]. We believe that the notification procedure is
therefore proper if such theory of liability is advanced.
Id- at 555, 309 N.E.2d at 554. There is no evidence that the compromise theory in fact
played any role in securing acceptance for the notice rule in our law. For the history of
the various arguments supporting the rule, see supra notes 17, 19-23, 25, 41 & 44-45.
59 A common justification for statutes of limitations is that they provide peace of
mind and contribute to stability of commerce. E.g., Fischer, supra note 37, at 2 (they
"[p]rovid[e] peace of mind so that people may cleanse their books of potential liabilities
which occurred before a certain date" and "[e]nhanc[e] commercial intercourse by free-
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Providing a short limitations period for buyers' claims against
sellers would enhance the ability of sellers to plan for the future.
Reliable information greatly enhances planning. An earlier cut-off
for buyers' claims would ensure sellers either knowledge of buyers'
claims or a defense against unknown claims sooner than under the
regular statute of limitations. Sellers arguably need this special pro-
tection because of the informational disadvantage they suffer con-
cerning the condition of the goods they have delivered to their
buyers. 60 Because how the courts will exercise their discretion
under the "reasonable time" standard is so uncertain,61 however,
the notice rule is a much less apt instrument for providing planning
information than a statute of limitations. This is a substantial objec-
tion to the repose rationale.
Even if we assume that the notice rule cuts off some claims ear-
lier than the regular limitations period and therefore provides some
additional information relevant to sellers' planning, the potential
ing individuals from the distraction and disruption of litigation"); Developments in the
Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter Developments]
("There comes a time when [one] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that
the slate has been wiped clean.. ."; "the public policy of limitations lies in avoiding the
disrupting effect that unsettled claims have on commercial intercourse."). Whether or
not the psychological benefit to defendants is a sufficient justification for the statute of
limitations, it is not a sufficient justification for the far shorter notice rule unless that
function also has economic value. The principal economic value of peace of mind ap-
pears to relate to the planning process.
The statute of limitations may also be justified as a tool to reduce the burden on the
courts and conserve public funds devoted to the court system by eliminating claims most
likely to be tenuous, inconsequential, or costly to litigate because of the loss of direct
evidence from the case load. Fischer, supra note 37, at 2; Developments, supra, at 1178.
Unlike the Article 2 limitations rule, the notice rule is a particularly inapt instru-
ment for eliminating cases from the courts. The limitations period begins to run at an
easily ascertainable date, tender of delivery of the goods to the buyer, U.G.C. § 2-
725(2), and generally expires after the passage of a fixed period of time (four years in
the absence of party agreement on a shorter period). Id. § 2-725(1). Although the
courts may apply tolling rules and other similar doctrines in a way that decreases the
certitude with which the limitations bar is applied to individual cases, Fischer, supra note
37, at 3, 33, the statute of limitations presents to the courts nowhere near the degree of
discretion that the "reasonable time" standard of the notice rule does. The unpredict-
ability of the notice rule is a serious objection to the business planning argument for the
rule. It is an even more serious objection to rationalizing the rule as a tool for eliminat-
ing litigation because the notice rule will usually present an issue for litigation.
60 Buyers will usually have knowledge of the factual basis for a seller's contract
breach claim without the benefit of notice, but the sellers may very likely not have knowl-
edge of the factual basis for the buyer's claims. A seller's claim is usually for the unpaid
portion of the price, and usually the buyer will know (or should know) that the seller has
delivered goods and expects payment. However, the goods' nonconformance to an ex-
press or implied warranty may not become apparent until after the goods have passed
into the buyer's exclusive possession and control.
For further discussion of the seller's informational disadvantage, see infra Section
II.B. 1.
61 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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savings seem slight. Enhancement of planning might help sellers
avoid costs in a number of ways. Knowing their liabilities earlier
could help sellers avoid some costs of credit and default. 62 A
shorter cut-off period might also save costs of record retention as
sellers can dispose of records sooner.63 None of the likely savings
appear substantial, however. In view of the notice rules and uncer-
tain application and the relatively slight savings that might be real-
ized, it seems doubtful that a prudent seller would choose to rely on
the notice rule to save record retention or financial over-extension
costs.
Because the possible benefits gained from early repose appear
so tenuous, it is questionable whether they outweigh the costs that
the notice rule imposes on buyers, small though they may be.6
Nevertheless, the planning benefits of early repose provide at least a
plausible basis for the notice rule.
The policy choice that underlies section 2-725, the Article 2
statute of limitations, is a firmer ground for dismissing the repose
justification. Section 2-725(1) accords relatively little weight to ben-
efits to be gained from prompt finality but great weight to costs that
rules of repose impose on claimants. Although neither section 2-
725(1), the accompanying official comments, nor the sparse legisla-
tive and drafting history of the section clearly expresses this policy
choice, two salient features of the Article 2 limitations rule support
the argument.
First, the official draft of the Article 2 statute of limitations im-
poses a relatively long limitations period of four years in the ab-
sence of party agreement to the contrary. To the extent that states
have enacted nonuniform amendments, they have uniformly length-
ened the limitations period.65 One can understand a statutory limi-
62 If the seller makes credit purchases without making provision for liability for as
yet unasserted past breaches, when the liability arises it might force the seller to default
on his payments, sell assets at distress value to raise the extra money needed, renegoti-
ate its loans, or, in a really extreme situation, lose equity in collateral through reposses-
sion or file for bankruptcy. Any of these courses of action may result in extra costs,
which the seller might have avoided by deferring the credit purchase until after it had
satisfied its breach liabilities.
Although the odds that any particular seller will actually incur such extra costs be-
cause of lack of notice may be low, in the aggregate, better information about outstand-
ing liabilities would give sellers a better opportunity to avoid losses that result from
financial overextension. Because situations of default and especially bankruptcy also
may involve substantial losses for the creditors involved, earlier repose could result in
conservation of total societal wealth.
63 The drafters of the Article 2 limitations period appear to have had this function
in mind for the four-year statute of limitations. They argued that the four-year period
"is within the normal commercial record keeping period." U.C.G. § 2-725 comment.
64 See supra note 12.
65 FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2)(b) (1981) (5 years); IOWA CODE § 614.1(4), (5) (1985) (10
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tations period as a balancing of the costs that the rule imposes on
claimants against the benefits that the rule generates. A four-year
limitations period therefore reflects a legislative decision that, in
general, the various policies served by a limitations period, includ-
ing repose, do not outweigh the costs to claimants for cut-off of
claims sooner than four years after they accrue. It is true that sec-
tion 2-725(1) represents that balancing only in connection with a
statute of limitations, not a notice rule, but the length of the limita-
tions period chosen nevertheless suggests a policy against attribut-
ing much weight to the benefits of quick repose.
Second, section 2-725(1) prohibits buyers and sellers from con-
tractually shortening the limitations period to less than one year,
and a number of states have prohibited contractual shortening of
the limitations period altogether. 66 This restriction apparently ex-
presses a policy decision that the benefits of a rule of repose never
outweigh the costs to claimants of cutting off their claims before ex-
piration of at least one year.
One could argue that the notice rule is an intentional exception
to the policies governing limitations periods. The notice rule does
not fall within the literal terms of section 2-725(1) and many courts
have interpreted the notice rule to require commercial buyers to
give notice in periods substantially shorter than one year.67 As
years for written contracts, 5 years for oral); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-725(1) (1972) (6
years); OxiA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-725(1) (1981) (5 years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(1),
(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (6-year limitations period, further lengthened by discovery rule
on accrual); Wis. STAT. § 402.725 (1964 & Supp. 1987) (6 years); cf R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 6A-2-725(5) (1985) (adding special 10-year rule for breach of warranty arising out of
alleged defects in products, apparently for purpose of placing 10-year cap on nonprivity
suits against remote sellers).
66 COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-725 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1985); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 15-1-5 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 57A-2-725(1) (1980); cf TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.070 (Vernon
1986) (setting 2-year minimum for contractually specified limitations period; but appar-
ently overridden by one-year minimum in Texas version of U.C.C. § 2-725, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2-725(a) (Vernon 1968)); Wis. STAT. § 402.725(1) (1964 & Supp.
1987) (shortening of limitations period enforceable only in contracts between
merchants).
67 See, e.g., Mariner Water Renaturalizer, Inc. v. Aqua Purification Systems, 665
F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding trial court finding that notice 5 to 8 weeks after
delivery was untimely); Smith-Moore Body Co. v. Heil Co., 603 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va.
1985) (7 months; applying Virginia law); Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp.
1514 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (8 months; applying Michigan law); EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-
Equip, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (65 days; applying Texas law); Fruin-
Colnon Corp. v. Air Door, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 804, 278 S.E.2d 708 (1981) (upholding
trial court finding that notice within 2 weeks unreasonable when defect discovered
shortly after delivery); Societe Nouvelle Vaskene v. Lehman Saunders, Ltd., 14 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 692 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1974) (3 1/2 months after most deliveries, 1
1/2 months after all deliveries, and at least 1 month after discovery of the defects, which
were readily apparent).
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pointed out above, notice rules are much less of a burden than limi-
tations periods. Therefore perhaps the legislature was concerned in
section 2-725(1) only with limiting how quickly parties must seek
access to the courts. Section 2-607(3)(a)'s notice rule arguably is
proof that the legislature did not intend to prohibit other rules that
bring about repose more quickly as long as they do not require filing
a lawsuit sooner than one year after the cause of action accrues. 68
As a means of redressing or avoiding prejudice to the seller, the
notice rule dearly is an exception to the rules set forth in section 2-
725(1) because protection against prejudice has long been regarded
as an important function of both the notice rule and the statute of
limitations. 69 Repose arguments, however, have only recently been
advanced and have never played a significant role in justifying the
notice rule.70 Thus, no basis exists to view the notice rule as an
exception to the policy disfavoring short limitations periods for the
sole purpose of securing the benefits of repose.71
In sum, enhancement of business planning might justify a spe-
cial short limitations period for buyers' claims against sellers, but
the justification is not a strong one. Moreover, such a justification
68 U.C.C. § 2-515(b) also provides for very quick finality and hence might be inter-
preted as inconsistent with the disfavor of quick repose purportedly underlying section
2-725. section 2-515(b) provides:
(b) the parties may agree to a third party inspection or survey to deter-
mine the conformity or condition of the goods and may agree that the
findings shall be binding upon them in any subsequent litigation or
adjustment.
Under an agreement sanctioned by this section the buyer's rights might be foreclosed at
or within a very short time of delivery by the error or oversight of the third party inspec-
tor. Cf. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 8.4, at 559-60.
This cut-off rule, however, at least provides a third-party determination of the
buyer's rights. The vice of a short limitations or notice period is that the buyer's rights
may be foreclosed without any good faith determination of those rights by a neutral
third party. Moreover, under a section 2-515(b) inspection, the buyer is assured that a
party other than the seller will inspect for defects. Under the notice rule, no inspection
necessarily takes place before the buyer loses all of its remedies.
69 The earliest cases under the notice rule in the Uniform Sales Act hinted at preju-
dice arguments. Cases clearly articulated these arguments by the 1930s. See supra note
41. Because the prejudice arguments are of the greatest vintage and clearly predate the
enactment of the current U.C.C. notice rule, it would not be reasonable to interpret the
one-year minimum in section 2-725 to grant buyers a minimum of one year in which to
give notice in cases in which the buyer's delay causes the seller prejudice.
70 See supra note 29.
It appears unlikely that any legislature enacted the notice rule on the basis of the
repose rationale. The rationale was not even clearly articulated prior to the early 1970s,
see supra note 45, although by 1968 forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands had enacted the Code with its notice rule. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 7, § 1, at 5.
71 The one-year minimum on limitations periods indicates a strong public policy
against contractually stipulated notice periods of less than one-year unless the seller can
show that it has probably been prejudiced by the buyer's delay. See infra Section III.B.
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represents a balancing of the benefits and costs imposed by a short
cut-off rule that is widely at variance with the approach taken in Arti-
cle 2's limitations periods.
II
THE PREJUDICE-BASED ARGUMENTS FOR THE NOTICE RULE
Antiprejudice rationales provide the strongest support for the
notice rule. The rule arguably protects the seller from two types of
prejudice that potentially apply to a wide spectrum of breach claims:
(1) loss of the opportunity to cure or otherwise reduce the damage
of a breach72 and (2) loss of evidence to refute unfounded claims of
breach. 73 The rule may also prevent two less generally applicable
harms: (1) loss of ability to pass liability for breach on to suppliers
or carriers because of expiration of the applicable limitations pe-
riod74 and (2) loss of the opportunity to avoid similar liability to
other buyers of the same or similar products. 75 Many cases, how-
ever, do not present the possibility of one of these types of preju-
dice, and even when prejudice does occur the notice rule's total bar
is not always needed to redress the harm.
A. Loss of Mitigation and Cure Opportunities
A common argument for the notice rule is that it is necessary to
protect the seller's ability to cure.76 In circumstances in which cure
72 See supra note 21.
73 See supra note 22.
74 Only a very few cases have mentioned this possibility. See, e.g., Owen v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 273 F.2d 140, 143 (9th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc.,
271 Ala. 101, 103, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960).
75 Phillips, supra note 5, at 466-67 (citing Owen, 273 F.2d at 143).
76 Some say this is the most important policy behind the rule. See, e.g., J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 421. The right to cure is commonly justified as a
protection for the seller against surprise rejection or rejection for trivial defects, not
because of real dissatisfaction with the goods, but because of a desire to get out of the
contract when there is a drop in the market price. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 997 (1983); Priest,
supra note 7, at 969-70, 1000 (both Karl Llewellyn and courts implementing cure right in
Code manifest this concern); Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of
Bargains, 16 B.C.L. REV. 543, 545 (1975); see also Eno, P'rice Movement and Unstated Objec-
tives to the Defective Performance of Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L.J. 782, 817 (1935) (arguing that
most Uniform Sales Act and pre-Uniform Sales Act cases applying waiver doctrine to
prevent buyer from relying at trial on defects not advanced at time of rejection involved
declining markets). This justification does not apply if the buyer keeps the goods be-
cause the only remedy at stake is damages.
The Uniform Commercial Code gives the seller a right to cure only in situations in
which the buyer rejects the goods. U.C.C. §§ 2-508, 2-612(2). Some courts have con-
cluded explicitly that no right to cure exists if the buyer seeks damages only. See
Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974); Boies v. Norton, 526 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975); see alsoJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 8-4, at 319 n.75 (citing
the foregoing cases); Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together after Material Breach-Common Law
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by the seller would avoid some of the damages that the buyer would
otherwise suffer as a result of the seller's breach, a rule forcing the
buyer to give the seller an opportunity to cure is consistent with the
mitigation principle, which bars the buyer from recovering damages
the buyer could have avoided by taking reasonable measures follow-
ing the breach. 77 The mitigation principle, enshrined in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, albeit in a somewhat indirect manner, 78
encourages the minimization of joint costs of breach so as to maxi-
mize the total wealth of the concerned parties.79 The notice rule,
consistent with this principle, provides a strong incentive for buyers
to give sellers an opportunity to offer cure and thereby minimize the
cost of their breaches.
The current notice rule is inconsistent with the mitigation prin-
ciple, however, in one very important respect. Whereas the mitiga-
tion principle only bars that portion of the buyer's damage claim
that the buyer could have avoided by reasonable action, the notice
rule, as currently conceived, bars the entire claim. The notice rule,
contrary to the individualized justice of mitigation, acts as a rule of
generalized justice, presuming prejudice in the full amount of the
claim.
The mitigation principle requires a type of notice rule in two
types of situations. In the first situation, the mitigation principle de-
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. CoLo. L. REV. 553,
586 (1976). As the text following this note argues, these cases are correctly decided if
one bears in mind that the mitigation principle may itself protect the seller's interest in
curing. See also Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d at 957 (buyer's failure to accept breaching
seller's offer to cure "raises ... the question of whether he has properly mitigated his
damages"); Hillman, supra, at 586.
A cure right and notice rule generally applicable to damage claims would in effect
give the seller the benefit of a clause limiting its liability to repair or replacement. Ex-
press contract clauses limiting the buyer's remedy to repair or replacement will be en-
forced as a reasonable limitation of remedy, U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a), but absent express
agreement, the buyer's remedies should not be construed as so limited.
77 The mitigation principle is also known as the "avoidable consequences" doc-
trine. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 76; Hillman, supra note 76.
78 The remedies sections of Article 2 are premised on the mitigation principle. For
example, when the buyer fails to accept or unjustifiably rejects or revokes acceptance of
the good but the seller fails to cover, the seller is normally entitled to recover only the
difference between the contract price and the market price. U.C.C. § 2-708(1). If there
is a market price, resale is possible to mitigate the loss of the sale to the breaching buyer
and the seller will be treated as if it has resold even if it has not. The seller can recover
the whole contract price only "if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell [the
goods] at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort
will be unavailing." Id. § 2-709(l)(b). The drafters of the Code also apparently meant
to make the mitigation principle generally applicable to the transactions covered by the
Code through the principle of good faith in enforcement. See supra note 24. Article 2's
only explicit statement of the mitigation principle is the rule that buyers can recover
consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach only if they "could not reason-
ably be prevented by cover or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
79 Goetz & Scott, supra note 76, at 969; Hillman, supra note 76, at 593-94.
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nies the buyer recovery of consequential damages that the seller
could have avoided with prompt notice.8 0 Nonetheless, the princi-
ple only eliminates the buyer's consequential damages claim, not its
claims for the costs of cure or diminution in value. If the buyer
avoids the damages by dealing with another party, the buyer is not
required to deal with the seller at all. Moreover, the mitigation prin-
ciple does not bar the buyer's claim for consequential damages that
prompt cure cannot avoid or reduce."'
The second situation in which the mitigation principle requires
a type of notice rule is when the buyer knows or should know that
the seller is the lowest-cost provider of cure. In such a case the
seller should not be liable for the difference between the market
cost of the cure and the seller's own lower cost of cure. If the buyer
had acted reasonably by giving the seller an opportunity to cure the
breach, the buyer could have avoided the differential.8 2 The mitiga-
tion principle only supports this result if the buyer acts unreasona-
bly.8 3 Thus, the mitigation bar is inapplicable if (1) the nature of the
80 For example, if the seller delivers a defective machine that the buyer needs in its
manufacturing process, the buyer may suffer loss of profits during the time it takes to
repair or replace the defective machine, but if the buyer acts with reasonable diligence to
obtain repair or replacement it can minimize the extent of the loss of profits.
Thus, Professors White and Summers are right in arguing that one legitimate func-
tion of the notice rule is to prevent the purchaser of a defective truck from remaining
silent about defects in the truck for a year and then recovering for profits lost during
that year because of the defect. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 9-6, at 344.
However, rather than demonstrating the need for a generally applicable notice rule, the
example simply shows how the mitigation principle expressly stated in U.C.C. § 2-
715(2)(a) should work.
81 For example, late delivery of a machine may hinder the buyer's performance on a
contract with a third party and force it to incur liability to the third party before the
seller can possibly repair or replace the machine.
82 Although many courts are loath to require a nonbreaching party to deal further
with a breaching party, it appears clear that some circumstances exist in which courts
will apply the mitigation principle in such cases. However, there is controversy over the
precise circumstances in which that should be true. Compare Hillman, supra note 76, at
586 (citing cases and arguing that the mitigation principle should "require" a non-
breaching party-under penalty of losing the portion of its damages claim that the party
could have avoided-to accept a materially breaching party's offer to perform the origi-
nal promise, even if with additional terms, if (1) acceptance of the new offer will reduce
damages, (2) the injured party can comply with the new offer, (3) the new offer is the
best available offer, (4) the offer does not purport to preclude the aggrieved party from
pursuing remedies with respect to the original breach, and (5) the breaching party pro-
vides adequate assurances of performance) with Goetz & Scott, supra note 76, at 992-93,
1005-11 (citing cases and arguing that courts have imposed a duty to deal with the
breaching party only in cases involving specialized performance because only in the ab-
sence of a market for substitute performance is application of the mitigation principle
required to ensure minimization ofjoint post-breach costs). The test stated in the text
harmonizes with both of these views. The buyer will have reason to believe that the
seller is the lowest-cost provider of cure chiefly in cases in which there is no market for
substitute performance.
83 Because of the mitigation principle, the nonbreaching party risks not receiving
[Vol. 73:534560
19881 AGAINST NOTICE
breach reasonably suggests that the buyer should have no confi-
dence in the seller's promise of cure, (2) the buyer has no reason to
believe that the seller is the lowest-cost source of cure, or (3) the
seller conditions its offer of cure on the buyer's agreement to re-
lease all damage claims. 84 Only in the unlikely case in which the
buyer has no reason to know that the seller can provide the lowest
cost cure would the notice rule tend to minimize the parties' joint
costs of breach in a way not already clearly required by the mitiga-
tion principle.
Many cases will not fall into any of the foregoing categories,
and in these cases notice and cure rules that protect the sellers will
not minimize joint costs of breach. For example, in many cases sell-
ers may not be the lowest-cost cure providers. 85 Even when the
buyer's delay prevents the seller from taking action to avoid some
costs of breach, the delay is unlikely to account for all of the buyer's
damages. 86 Such cases provide an argument against a flat bar of the
buyer's entire damage remedy, but provide justification for a rule
that bars damages the seller could have prevented if the buyer had
given timely notice.
its full expectancy damages if it fails to satisfy the requirements of the mitigation princi-
ple or loses the issue in litigation even though it did act in accordance with the principle.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 76, at 972 (discussing the "tension between performance and
mitigation responsibilities"). If courts apply the rule to create a penalty for refusing to
deal with a breaching party in certain circumstances, it may also become a tool for bad-
faith chiselers attempting to evade a portion of their contractual liabilities because the
principle detracts from the clear enforceability of the chiseler's contractual obligation.
Id. at 978. Therefore, the mitigation principle is satisfied if the nonbreaching party acts
"reasonably," and the courts "evaluate the available mitigation strategies from the
plaintiff's perspective at the time of breach and do not penalize him if he selected a
reasonable strategy that proved retrospectively to be inferior." Id. at 974 n.19; see also id.
at 974-76 nn.19-22 & 25-27 (discussing cases showing courts' general policy in applying
the mitigation principle has been to apply it with a degree of liberality toward the non-
breaching party so as to prevent the doctrine from becoming a trap for the injured
party). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 3.7, at 186-87.
84 For this final point, see Hillman, supra note 76, at 607-09.
85 If the breaching seller's cure involves significant transportation charges, either to
ship the defective good to a workshop for repair or replacement or to transport replace-
ment goods, workers, or machinery to the buyer's site, it is especially likely that others
can provide cure at lower cost.
86 In one specific situation the buyer's delay in notice would prevent the seller from
avoiding costs equal to the full amount of the buyer's claim for breach. That possibility
is presented if the seller is in the position to take back the defective good, replace it with
a new one, and resell the nonconforming good on a secondary market with virtually no
cost. The argument is unlikely to apply to specially designed or manufactured goods.
Furthermore, a secondary market for the nonconforming goods must exist, the seller
has to have more goods than it can sell on the primary market but no excess with respect
to the secondary market, and no significant transportation or other transaction costs
must be involved. This situation is unlikely to arise very often.
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B. The Evidence-Gathering Rationale
The second prejudice argument that appears to apply to a
broad spectrum of cases is the evidence-gathering rationale. Ac-
cording to the evidence-gathering argument, prompt notice in-
creases the seller's chances to gather important evidence to refute a
buyer's unjustified claims of breach while the evidence is still rela-
tively fresh.8 7 This argument seems especially plausible if the buyer
disposes of allegedly defective goods before giving the seller notice,
thus denying the seller an opportunity to verify the alleged defect.
For example, if a buyer of peaches claims that the seller breached
the implied warranty of merchantability by delivering rotten fruit,
but the buyer destroyed the peaches before notifying the seller of
the complaint, the seller is significantly prejudiced. 88
This rationale presents two problems. First, the argument re-
lies on the premise that sellers, but not buyers, suffer this kind of
prejudice because sellers cannot monitor the condition of the goods
after delivery. In many cases, however, the seller does not suffer an
informational disadvantage with respect to the breach, or the infor-
mational disadvantage has no practical consequences. Second, even
when the seller does suffer an informational disadvantage, the
buyer's delay is more likely to harm the buyer's own case than to
harm the seller's defense, so the notice rule is unnecessary. The
following section considers each of these objections and proposes a
fairer alternative to the notice rule's absolute bar.
1. Limited Cases in Which Sellers Suffer Informational Disadvantage
Time is the truth seeker's enemy. Evidence decays with time;
memories fade and documents are destroyed or lost. In a very gen-
eral way, protection against loss of evidence justifies any cut-off
rule.8 9 Most cut-off rules, however, treat equally all parties to legal
disputes. The one-to-four year limitations period of Article 2 ap-
plies equally to buyers and sellers.90 The notice rule, however, de-
87 See authorities cited supra note 22.
88 Cf T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1980)
(boll-weevil-infested flour).
89 The United States Supreme Court has stated in oft-quoted language that without
statutes of limitations fraud might be perpetrated by the prosecution of stale claims be-
cause "'evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared.'" American Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (quoting
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); ac-
cord W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVINGS STATUTES 43, 46 (1978) ("pri-
mary purpose of the [original English] statutes [of limitations] was to protect defendant
against loss of witnesses and evidence and to protect his acts in reasonable reliance on
plaintiff's inaction"; same purpose for U.S. statutes); Fischer, supra note 37, at 2; Develop-
ments, supra note 59, at 1185.
90 See supra note 54.
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spite the fact that both parties face equal prejudice from the passage
of time, applies only to buyers.
The scope of the notice rule restricts it to situations in which
the seller has a special concern, not shared by the buyer, over losing
important rebuttal evidence. The notice rule applies only to a
buyer's claims for damages after it has accepted the goods. 91 The
seller loses possession of and access to the goods at delivery. Con-
sequently, after delivery the seller must depend on the buyer for
information about the goods' physical state or performance. Once
the buyer gives notice of a complaint about the goods, the Code
eliminates the informational disadvantage by giving the seller a right
to inspect, test, and sample the goods in the possession of the
buyer.9 2
The "rotten peaches" case illustrates this type of prejudice. In
the peaches case, the buyer destroys the only tangible evidence of
the alleged defect before the seller's representatives can see the
goods. If a carrier delivered the goods and particularly if the goods
were packaged at the time of delivery so that no representative on
whom the seller can rely to represent its interest was present when
the buyer allegedly discovered the defect,93 the buyer's delay in giv-
ing notice deprives the seller of the one chance to obtain evidence
to refute or confirm the buyer's testimony.9 4
Only informational disadvantages with respect to the factual ba-
91 The language of section 2-607(3)(a) excludes application of the notice rule to
claims of nondelivery. Courts have shown no inclination to extend the reach of the
notice rule in this regard. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d
134, 152 n.40 (6th Cir. 1983); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp.
245 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975).
92 U.C.C. § 2-515(a) provides:
In furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or dispute
(a) either party on reasonable notification to the other and for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the facts and preserving evidence has the right to
inspect, test and sample the goods including such of them as may be in
the possession or control of the other; ...
93 If the seller is shipping the peaches via a carrier under a destination contract
(F.O.B. buyer's plant, for example), the seller is liable to the buyer if the peaches are not
merchantable when they arrive, U.C.C. §9 2-319(l)(b), 2-503. Yet the seller is unlikely
to have one of its own representatives present at the time the carrier delivers the
peaches to the buyer. The buyer's witnesses may therefore be the only witnesses with
personal knowledge of the facts relevant to the liability issue.
Of course, the seller is not subject to this disadvantage at all under a shipment
contract (F.O.B. seller's warehouse) because the seller is only required to put con-
forming goods into the hands of a carrier at its warehouse. Id. §§ 2-319(l)(a), 2-503(1),
(2), 2-504. Moreover, even in a destination contract the carrier may be able to confirm
or refute the buyer's testimony concerning the condition of the goods at delivery.
94 If one of the seller's witnesses examined the goods at delivery and can testify that
they in fact conformed, the seller suffers no informational disadvantage unless, as a re-
sult of the buyer's delay, the seller's witness becomes unavailable and the seller has not
preserved the evidence.
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sis for the claim of breach justify the notice rule. Disadvantages in
respect to knowledge about the buyer's intentions to sue or ques-
tions about the extent of consequential damages do not justify the
rule. Sellers have no special disadvantage in determining another
party's intention to sue.9 5 Moreover, delivery of the goods does not
effect the seller's ability to gather evidence regarding consequential
damages. If the seller knows of factual grounds for the breach
claim, it may gather evidence from third parties and thus may not be
disadvantaged at all with respect to evidence not under the buyer's
exclusive control. With respect to evidence in the exclusive posses-
sion of the buyer, the seller can protect itself by seeking informa-
tion, either directly or indirectly, from the buyer. 96 In neither case
would timely notice usually gain the seller any additional rebuttal
evidence concerning damages. 97
If informational disadvantage is the essential reason for limiting
the notice rule to buyers' post-acceptance damage claims, and if
such informational disadvantage is limited to knowledge of the fac-
tual basis for a claim of breach, then the evidence-gathering ration-
ale fails to justify applying the rule to large classes of breach claims.
For example, the seller will virtually always know if the goods are
delivered late.98 The buyer's delay in giving notice in such a case
95 For the seller to exercise his section 2-515 rights requires a "claim or dispute."
One might argue from this section that the seller's informational disadvantage is not
dispelled by notice merely of the factual basis for a breach claim because until the buyer
makes an actual claim, there is no "claim or dispute" to bring section 2-515 into opera-
tion. However, if the seller, upon learning of the factual basis for a breach claim, re-
quests access to goods in the buyer's possession for the purpose of verifying the'factual
allegations of the notice and the buyer refuses the request on the ground that there is no
"claim or dispute," the doctrine of estoppel is available to prevent unfairness. It is not
necessary to broaden the notion of the informational disadvantage to which the notice
rule is addressed in order to take care of this one narrow circumstance.
96 Certainly a buyer that deliberately misleads a seller upon inquiry concerning the
likely extent of harm resulting from the seller's breach is courting an estoppel defense to
its subsequent claim for much larger damages, at least if the seller can show that it has
been prejudiced by relying on the buyer's original low estimate of damages.
97 Courts have never interpreted the notice rule to require the buyer to assert a
particular amount of damages. Moreover, the Code provides the seller no special pre-
litigation right of access to evidence relating to damages issues; section 2-515(a) is lim-
ited to testing and sampling the good itself. Although FED. R. Civ. P. 27 authorizes pre-
litigation depositions and document production in certain cases, it has generally been
reserved for perpetuation of testimony and has not been regarded as a discovery tool.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 543 n.26 (4th ed. 1983); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 9, § 2071.
98 If in a destination contract the seller ships the goods in a timely manner but the
carrier delays delivery beyond the contractual delivery date, the seller is not likely to
know it has breached until it receives notice. However, this situation does not raise
evidentiary problems for the seller because there is not likely to be a dispute over the
allegation of late delivery. If the seller faces any prejudice in this situation, it is more
likely to be loss of the claim against the carrier. See infra Section II.C. 1. In practice, the
risk of this prejudice is likely to be small because carriers usually disclaim or limit liabil-
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cannot prejudice the seller by denying him access to evidence of the
cause of breach.
Similarly, the evidence-gathering rationale does not justify en-
forcing the notice rule in many breach-of-warranty cases. The most
obvious example involves a seller that already knows of the defect at
the time of delivery. The evidence-gathering rationale does not ap-
ply because the seller has no informational disadvantage. Nor
should the notice rule apply if the allegedly defective goods are
available at the time of suit and the passage of time has not
prejudiced the seller's efforts to determine if the goods really were
defective at the time of delivery. The evidence-gathering rationale
thus excludes cases that involve admitted defects or delivery of the
wrong goods and cases in which the only issue is whether the goods
in question have a defective design.99
In sum, the cases that justify special protection for sellers
against the potential loss of rebuttal evidence are those in which a
bona fide dispute exists over one of the following issues: (1)
whether the goods were nonconforming at delivery or (2) whether
the goods became nonconforming during the warranty period.
2. Extent of Prejudice
An examination of the cases in which the evidence-gathering
rationale most strongly justifies the notice rule reveals a paradox.
The cases that best justify a notice rule are the same cases in which
delay is least likely to constitute any real prejudice to the seller be-
cause the buyer's delay will most likely undermine the buyer's own
credibility.
Consider again the case of the rotten peaches destroyed with-
ity for the consequential damages of delay. None of the reported decisions applying the
notice rule to delay claims appears to have involved allegations that the delay was the
fault of a carrier.
99 This was exactly the situation in EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 238 (S.D. Tex. 1982), which involved six ten-ton steel heads that had been cast in
the wrong shape for the buyer's order. The court held that the buyer's damages claim
was barred because the buyer did not give notice for sixty-five days after delivery. Id. at
248. Yet there was simply no way in which seller's efforts to protect itself from un-
founded claims as to the defect could have been hurt by the delay. Once the buyer
raised the complaint, the seller could have verified that the casting was not in the con-
tractually required shape. No reasonable possibility existed that the steel heads could
have been in the wrong shape at that time unless they were also in the wrong shape at
the time of delivery.
To generalize from this example, any defect claim in which the following conditions
are true would not fit the evidence-gathering rationale: (a) the physical evidence of the
alleged defect in the goods is available when the buyer eventually makes the claim; (b)
no possibility exists that the buyer's misuse or failure to maintain the goods caused the
defect; and (c) no reason explains the condition of the goods at the time of the claim
other than that they were delivered in that condition.
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out any commercial justification before the buyer notified the seller
of the alleged defect. Suppose the buyer's witnesses are the only
ones who testify that the peaches were rotten at delivery. The very
fact that the buyer destroyed the only physical evidence that might
have corroborated the buyer's claims without commercial justifica-
tion before the seller could verify the alleged defect is suspicious.
Such suspicious circumstances will tend to undermine the credibility
of the buyer's testimony. Moreover, because the buyer accepted the
goods, the buyer carries the burden of persuasion on the issue of
whether the seller breached. 100
Because the standard of proof that the buyer must meet is only
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, sellers may fear that
doubts raised by the loss of evidence due to the buyer's delay will
not be sufficient to prevent the trier of fact from finding for the
buyer. Nevertheless, the risk in most cases seems very small. In
some cases other evidence may corroborate the buyer's testi-
mony,101 making it highly unlikely that the lost evidence would have
100 U.C.C. § 2-607(4).
101 For example, in the "rotten peaches" case a neutral third party's testimony, such
as a government fruit inspector prevent at delivery, might corroborate the testimony of
buyer's witnesses. But see General Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d
1262 (Fla. App. 1980) (notice rule invoked to bar buyer's claim because buyer destroyed
canned grapefruit that state department of agriculture deemed unfit for human con-
sumption without first notifying seller). In such a case, the odds are that the seller will
lose if not given the benefit of the notice rule, but scant reason exists to fear that buyer's
witnesses are lying.
Although neutral third parties may not always be available to confirm or refute a
buyer's claims, other types of corroborative evidence such as movies, photographs, or
inspection reports may exist. The corroboration will be strongest if the documentary
evidence was made before the buyer decided to file suit, but even if the buyer creates
such evidence with litigation in mind, there may be no basis for challenging its authen-
ticity. For example, in Standard Alliance Indus. Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813
(6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), the court applied the notice rule bar
even though the buyer had made a movie of the machine's allegedly defective operation
shortly after the buyer filed suit and shortly before the machine was destroyed. Id at
826. The court determined that the buyer's delay in giving notice prejudiced the seller
by depriving it of the opportunity to make its own film, but the court also thought that it
did not need to address the seller's specific objections to the film. Id. at 826-27. The
court stated that "UCC § 2-607's notice requirement is designed to forestall the very
difficulties [allegations of prejudice] which developed here." Id. at 827. Yet if no reason
to doubt the movie's authenticity or the accuracy of its depiction of the machine's mal-
functions exists, then it is hard to see how the seller was prejudiced. The lack of preju-
dice in this case is especially clear because the court conceded that "the evidence that
the machine was defective was overwhelming," id. at 826, and that the jury could prop-
erly have found that the seller had full knowledge when it ceased its repair efforts that
they "were an utter failure." Id. at 824. The court's only suggestion of prejudice is that
the seller "may have been able to put on a spirited defense, especially as to damages,
had it gotten early notice and followed up by inspecting the machine." Id. at 826-27.
For an argument that protection against loss of damages evidence is not within the
scope of the notice rule, see supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
It should also be noted that in a case in which the actual physical evidence of the
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refuted the buyer's claims. In cases in which no corroborative evi-
dence exists, the buyer who would lose today under the notice rule
would also likely lose if the trier of fact were permitted to consider
the merits of the breach claim because the two issues are decided by
the same trier of fact' 0 2 and are based on the same factors. 10 3 But in
a significant number of the reported cases, corrobative evidence
suggests that the flat bar of the current notice rule shields sellers
from liability for actual breaches.10 4
alleged defect is no longer available at the time of the lawsuit, the seller is entitled to
discover any reports or opinions of experts that buyer may have hired to inspect the
goods because it would be manifestly impossible for the seller to obtain facts or opin-
ions about the conformity of the good by other means. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A),
(B).
102 Courts have never used the notice rule as ajury control device. Rather, the ques-
tion whether notice was given within a reasonable time is a question of fact, for the jury
if there is one. See supra note 30.
103 Because the courts tend to interpret the notice rule in light of its supposed func-
tions, prejudice arguments have strongly influenced the courts even if they do not re-
quire a showing of prejudice before applying the notice rule. See supra note 36. The
buyer's delay will likely result in a decision for the seller if the seller shows that the delay
caused the seller to lose the only evidence available to rebut uncorroborated claims by
witnesses tied to the buyer. It is hard to imagine that if the court did not apply the
notice rule, the same judge or jury would find on the same facts that the buyer carried
the burden of showing that the goods were defective.
104 This is especially likely to be the case when the buyer does not seek to recover
consequential damages but merely the diminution in value or'cost to repair the breach.
See, e.g., Mariner Water Renaturalizer of Wash., Inc. v. Aqua Purification Systems, Inc.,
665 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Dir. 1981) (water regulators breached warranty because they were
not classified by Environmental Protection Agency as purifiers, yet court upheld dismis-
sal of buyer's diminution-in-value claim for delay of 5 to 8 weeks in giving notice); C.R.
Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (defects in bags
verified at time of suit and not the type that could have resulted from buyer misuse);
Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101 (Ala. 1983); Fleet Maintenance, Inc. v. Burke
Energy Midwest Corp., 11 Kan. App. 2d 523, 728 P.2d 408 (1986) (engine block con-
tained "pinholes," which could be verified at time of suit and which could not apparently
have resulted from buyer misuse in the short period of time the buyer operated the
truck); Hydronic Enters., Inc. v. DanalJewelry Co., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1537 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1986) (seller not challenging buyer's claim that gold solutions
were subject to gold shortages; independent testing agent verified shortages); Agway,
Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 472 A.2d 1250 (1984) (there was evidence that carpet had
suffered substantial deterioration in value in one year); see also case discussed supra note
99 and two cases discussed supra note 101.
Nor can the seller ever show prejudice in cases involving claims for delay in deliv-
ery, but see cases cited supra note 32, or in other cases in which the seller knows of the
facts constituting the breach by the time of delivery. But see Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox,
Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (seller knew at delivery that it had used wrong
component, but court found its knowledge irrelevant to notice rule).
In many cases, especially ones involving claims for consequential damages, the
seller may have suffered prejudice with respect to the consequential damages claim by
reason of the delay in notice without having been harmed with respect to the claim for
direct damages. For example, in K & M. Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 669 F.2d
1106 (6th Cir. 1982), it is possible that some of the buyer's claims were for consequent-
ial damages which might have been avoided had it given the seller timely notice, but it
was also clear that there were substantial defects in the machine. Id at 1115. Lack of
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3. Using Presumptions to Overcome Possible Prejudice
The foregoing argument indicates that the likelihood of actual
prejudice is always so small that the evidence-gathering rationale for
the notice rule is in fact very weak. Any lingering concerns about
the possibility of prejudice from loss of evidence can be eliminated
by granting the seller a rebuttable presumption that specific evi-
dence the seller lost as a result of the buyer's delay would have re-
futed the buyer's claim.10 5 This remedy is more moderate than the
absolute bar of the current notice rule and therefore provides a bet-
ter accommodation of buyer and seller interests.
The seller could not claim the presumption unless it could
prove that, as a result of the buyer's delayed notice, it lost the
chance to obtain or preserve a specific source of evidence relevant
to the breach issue that the seller would not normally have obtained
or preserved in the absence of a dispute. In the rotten peaches case,
for example, if the buyer, without commercial reason, destroyed the
fruit before the seller's representative could inspect it, the court
might instruct the factfinder to presume that, had the seller's repre-
sentative viewed the fruit, she would have testified that it was not
rotten. The factfinder could weigh that presumption against the
credibility of the buyer's representative who testifies that the fruit
was rotten when delivered. 106
This approach concedes that the mere loss of potentially signifi-
cant evidence is a prejudice to the seller but avoids the extreme of
shielding the seller from liability in cases in which the available evi-
dence strongly indicates that the seller did breach. The presump-
tion formalizes whatever negative inference a factfinder would draw
when the buyer's delay in giving notice prevents the seller from ob-
taining potential rebuttal evidence. Although this approach still
overprotects the seller by giving the seller the benefit of a presump-
tion even when the available evidence indicates that the seller in fact
breached,10 7 it also allows the trier of fact to consider whether the
available evidence overcomes the presumption. The alternative of
requiring the seller to prove actual harm from loss of evidence
would pose an impossible burden of proof for the seller, and the
alternative of requiring the seller to demonstrate a likelihood that
prompt notice should not have changed the seller's liability for the direct damages of
repairing the defects.
105 I am particularly indebted to Professor Mary Lou Fellows for having suggested
the use of presumptions for this purpose.
106 An alternative rule that requires the buyer to prove breach by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence to overcome the presumption would provide the seller even more
protection. This extra level of protection does not seem warranted given the considera-
ble doubt that sellers are actually prejudiced.
107 See supra note 104.
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lost evidence would have supported the seller's defense would in
effect require the court to decide the case on the basis of the avail-
able evidence anyway, thus eliminating any protection from the po-
tential prejudice. Requiring the seller to identify specific sources of
lost evidence, on the other hand, does not unduly burden the seller
because the seller should be able to identify the sources of evidence
it could have obtained if notified earlier. The use of presumptions
thus is a reasonable way to protect the seller from this form of
prejudice.'0 8
In sum, the evidence-gathering rationale does not justify sec-
tion 2-607's broad notice rule. At most the rationale justifies a nar-
rower rule that applies only in situations in which the seller makes a
prima facie showing of prejudice by proving that the buyer's unrea-
sonable delay destroyed the seller's opportunity to gather specific
sources of evidence to refute the buyer's breach claim. Even in
these cases, granting the seller a rebuttable presumption that the
lost evidence would have shown that the goods were conforming
appears sufficient to overcome the asserted prejudice. The greater
protection of the current rule simply shields sellers from liability for
actual breaches.
C. Less Widely Applicable Types of Possible Prejudice
The notice rule might also protect sellers against two other po-
tential forms of prejudice: (1) loss of claims against suppliers or
carriers and (2) loss of the opportunity to avoid similar liability to
other buyers. Unlike the mitigation/cure and evidence-gathering
108 One additional possible cost associated with the loss of evidence is the seller's
costs of additional uncertainty created by loss of evidence that could have confirmed or
rebutted the claim. Greater uncertainty may add to the costs that both parties incur in
seeking dispute resolution. For example, dispute resolution in which significant, poten-
tially confirmatory evidence was lost may require greater involvement by company em-
ployees than would have been the case if the seller could have obtained confirmation or
rebuttal of the buyer's claim through inspection. As a result of the loss, the seller may
have to engage in a time-consuming or expensive or less dispositive hunt for evidence.
There are two responses to this argument. First, uncertainty sufficient to create ex-
tra costs is only created by loss of significant, potentially corroborative evidence in cases
in which the only testimony on an issue of liability or damages comes from witnesses
with ties of interest or affection to the buyer. The existence of other evidence that cor-
roborates or refutes the buyer's witnesses makes it much more dubious that the seller
will incur extra costs. Of course, the seller may pay extra to dig out the other evidence,
but this expense does not necessarily constitute an extra cost. In most cases, the rational
seller will seek to gather all economically available evidence to evaluate a claim.
Second, the cost of extra uncertainty should be relatively insignificant. The rational
seller attempts to control its claims-evaluation and dispute-settlement costs. The goal of
good claims management is to contain the costs of uncertainty. Thus, though some
costs associated with greater uncertainty about the validity of the buyer's claim may ex-
ist, it is hard to imagine that they are generally large enough to justify a rule that cuts off
all of the buyer's remedies for breach.
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rationales, neither of these applies to all sellers' breach cases. Nor is
either an important current justification for the rule. Nevertheless,
in the narrow range of cases to which these justifications apply, they
provide a sounder argument for the complete bar of the notice rule
than the mitigation/cure or lost evidence rationales.
1. Loss of Claims Against Suppliers
Most sellers depend upon goods or services supplied by others
to fulfill their performance requirements. Other parties' breaches
thus may cause the seller to breach a contract with its own buyers.
When that happens, the seller usually hopes to pass on its liability to
the breaching supplier, subcontractor, or carrier.'0 9
Where a seller's supplier provides defective goods that the
seller resells or incorporates into its own product without discover-
ing the defect, the seller risks being caught between two limitations
periods, the period that forecloses the buyer's right of action against
the seller and the period that forecloses the seller's right of action
against the supplier. In both cases, the cause of action for breach of
warranty accrues at tender of delivery.1 i0 If the same four-year limi-
tations period applies to both the buyer's and the seller's causes of
action, the statute of limitations forecloses the middleman-seller's
suit against its supplier before it forecloses the buyer's suit against
the middleman-seller because the supplier had to deliver before the
seller did. During the gap, the seller can be forced to bear the full
liability for the supplier's breach. One might therefore argue that
sellers need the notice rule's protection against liability for third
party breaches that the buyer's unreasonable delay in giving notice
might force the seller to bear.'
109 The seller may do so through separate lawsuit, by impleading, or by vouching in
under U.C.C. § 2-607(5). In some cases, however, the middleman-seller may have had
to accept greater liability toward its own buyers than the third parties have accepted vis-
d-vis the seller. The suppliers may, for example, have insisted on warranty disclaimers
that the seller's buyer would not accept or on much shorter limitations periods than the
seller's buyer would accept.
1 10 U.C.C. § 2-725(2). The gap is less likely to occur with respect to claims that a
carrier damaged the goods because the cause of action against the carrier generally ac-
crues at the point of delivery to the buyer, the same point at which the buyer's cause of
action accrues against the seller. However, for interstate carriage, the period of limita-
tion for damage claims against the carrier is two years. 49 U.S.C. § 11706(c) (1982).
Therefore, under a four-year limitations period for suits against the seller, potential for
a similar gap of sizable proportions exists. The seller's best defense against this gap is
to sell F.O.B. its own plant or warehouse so that it will have no liability for damage to
the goods in transit. SeeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 3-5, at 108.
111 The gap does not exist in those jurisdictions in which the courts treat the middle-
man-seller's claim over against the supplier as a claim for indemnity that does not accrue
until the seller pays on the buyer's claim against him. See, e.g., City of Clayton v. Grum-
man Emergency Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (applying Missouri
law); cf Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, 355 A.2d 898, 903, 907 (Del. Super. Ct.
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I Although the prejudice on which this argument turns is much
clearer than in the case of the evidence-gathering rationale, it
should not be overstated. By virtue of the position of distributor,
dealer, or components assembler, the middleman-seller generally
assumes a substantial risk of liability caused by others' poor per-
formance. For example, the component supplier may become bank-
rupt or simply disappear.1 2 Even with the benefit of a notice rule,
the buyer's notice within a "reasonable" time may arrive too late for
the seller to initiate suit against the third party before the limitations
period expires. Thus, the buyers' unreasonable delay in giving no-
tice may increase the number of cases in which sellers bear liability
for a third party's breach, but it is not clear that the increase is
substantial.
The middleman-seller could reduce or eliminate the risk of the
limitations periods gap without a notice rule by obtaining extended
warranties from its suppliers. 1 3 An extended warranty would pro-
vide more certain protection against the risk of the gap, but it-would
also be expensive to the seller because the supplier assumes sub-
stantially increased risk. Thus, the costs to sellers for warranties
from suppliers probably equals or exceeds the concededly minor
costs that the notice rule imposes on buyers. It therefore might be
cheaper for sellers to purchase express contractual notice rules in
1976) (apparently treating claim against supplier as indemnity action because court al-
lows claim more than four years after delivery of allegedly defective goods; applying
Colorado law). Of the few courts to have passed on this point, however, a slight major-
ity have held that if the claim is made with respect to a sale of goods, Article 2 requires
treating the cause of action against the supplier as accruing at delivery even though the
claim may be considered a claim for indemnity. Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg.
Co., 634 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (applying Mississippi law); PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Genson, 135 Ga. App. 248, 217 S.E.2d 479 (1975); Maxfield v. Simmons, 96 Ill. 2d 81,
449 N.E.2d 110 (1983); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah
1984).
The majority view is the better one because the rule on accrual in Article 2 appar-
ently was intended to create a highly predictable cut-off rule. For example, the official
comment to section 2-725 states that the four-year limitations period was selected "as
the most appropriate to modem business practice. This is within the normal commercial
record keeping period." The implication is that the rule is designed to protect business
expectations that after four years records of transactions that have not resulted in litiga-
tion may be destroyed. The minority view would subvert that goal for most sellers of
goods by creating in effect a discovery rule of accrual for at least some claims against
sellers of goods.
112 The risk that the seller's claim against a supplier will be uncollectible is reduced
considerably if the component supplier is a major company and could be virtually elimi-
nated by such devices as performance bonds or standby letters of credit.
113 Pre-breach agreements to extend the limitations period for goods are not en-
forceable, U.C.C. § 2-725(1), but an agreement to extend the warranty against defects
beyond the delivery date will achieve the same result of lengthening the period from
delivery of the components until expiration of the limitation period.
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contracts with their buyers than extended warranties in contracts
with their suppliers.
This rationale for the notice rule thus essentially argues that the
notice rule is the least-cost method of eliminating the risk posed to
sellers by the potential gap in limitations periods. Without the no-
tice rule, sellers will likely try to raise their prices to reflect the costs
of the additional risk. Buyers, however, would not choose this solu-
tion because it would force them to pay for the risk in every case
whereas a notice rule would give them an opportunity to avoid the
cost by giving reasonable notice. Therefore, the majority of buyers
and sellers probably would agree to a notice rule limited to achieve
this purposes. Thus, imposing the notice rule for this purpose in
the absence of party agreement to the contrary should reduce trans-
action costs. 14
The argument does not, however, justify applying the notice
rule to all buyers' post-acceptance claims. In many cases the seller
does not lose a claim against a third party because of the buyer's
unreasonably delayed notice.' 15 If the seller has lost a claim, it is
not difficult to prove that loss. Buyers and sellers should therefore
prefer a notice rule that applies only if the seller shows that he lost a
claim against a supplier because of the buyer's delay in giving no-
tice. Because it poses virtually no risk of cutting off buyers' claims
when the seller does not suffer this prejudice, such a rule protects
sellers from this kind of prejudice at the least cost to buyers.
2. Loss of Opportunity to Avoid Similar Liability to Others
The final type of prejudice that is occasionally used to justify
the notice rule is the seller's potential loss of opportunity to avoid
the same breaches on similar contracts with other buyers. 116 For
example, upon receiving notice from a buyer that the wiring in a
heating panel is defectively overheating, the manufacturer-seller can
check its manufacturing process and components to eliminate the
defect in panels subsequently manufactured, thereby saving future
114 A great deal of literature explores this kind of argument for contract rules. See,
e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 76, at 971.
115 The argument does not apply at all to the seller's liability for its own nonper-
formance or misperformance. Moreover, there is little likelihood of a gap in the case of
claims against service contractors because the period of limitations applicable to claims
under written contracts other than contracts for the sale of goods is in many states
longer than the four-year rule in U.C.C. § 2-725. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2)(b)
(1985) (5 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 13-206 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (10 years); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.190(l)(b) (Michie 1986) (6 years); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 213
(McKinney 1978) (6 years); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.080 (1983) (6 years); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-23(2) (1953) (6 years). But see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982) (4
years); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986) (4 years).
116 See supra note 75.
572 [Vol. 73:534
19881 AGAINST NOTICE 573
buyers from this fire danger and shielding the seller from additional
liability. Moreover, by minimizing liability for product defects, the
seller may reap the benefits of lower products-liability insurance
premiums. The lower costs may be reflected ultimately in lower
prices. The buyer's delay in giving notice arguably deprives the
seller of these benefits. 117
There are, however, very few cases in which the notice rule is
likely to secure these benefits for sellers. Although'this argument
initially appears strongest in the case of dangerous defects that are
likely to cause bodily injury or significant damage to property, it is
precisely in this kind of case that the buyer will probably also have
strict-liability tort remedies,1 18 which under current law are not sub-
ject to the notice rule. 119 The range of cases in which the notice
rule may impel buyers to give timely notice is thus narrowed.120
117 The argument applies chiefly to mass-produced goods, a large portion of which
are sold to consumers. Although commercial buyers also undoubtedly buy substantial
quantities of mass-produced goods, the argument is not likely to fit the seller of specially
designed and manufactured goods.
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (imposing strict liability on
seller of defective product that causes "physical harm ... to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property"). The chief reason the buyer might be forced to rely on a
breach of warranty suit for these damages is the running of the statute of limitations
applicable to the tort cause of action. Even in jurisdictions in which the limitations
period applicable to tort causes of action is shorter than the period applicable to con-
tracts suits, the tort causes of action do not necessarily extinguish first because the limi-
tations periods for torts do not begin to run until the buyer suffers injury and could
reasonably have discovered it. W. KEETON, supra note 14, § 30, at 165-68. Because this
discovery rule of accrual creates the potential for very long periods of exposure, some
states have placed caps on the period of exposure through so-called "repose" statutes,
which typically are at least as long as the limitations period for contract suits. Id. at 168
n.31.
119 See supra note 5.
120 Between business buyers and sellers, however, contract causes of action may re-
main important, especially in cases in which there is no personal injury or other property
damage. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18-19, 403 P.2d 145, 151-52,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23-24 (1965) (stating in dictum that a buyer that suffers "economic loss
alone," like lost profits as a result of a defect in a good, is not able to recover in tort, but
also stating in dictum that tort recovery is available for physical damages to other parts
of the defective product caused by the defect itself). The United States Supreme Court
has followed many courts in ignoring the second part of the Seely dictum and characteriz-
ing the Seely rule as one that precludes tort recovery "ifa defective product causes purely
monetary harm," East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868
(1986) (adopting Seely rule for admiralty law), by which the Court meant to preclude tort
recovery not only for lost profits but also for the costs to repair the defect and damage
done to the rest of the good by the defect. Id. at 875. The Court referred to this as the
majority rule. Id. at 868.
The contrary position is represented by those courts that have extended tort law to
cover "economic loss" if caused by a defect that created a danger of personal injury or
damage to other property. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1981) (tort recovery turns on nature of the defect, the
type of risk, the manner in which the injury arose); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or.
587, 595, 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978) (attempting to distinguish between "the disap-
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Moreover, this form of seller prejudice is speculative. Possibly,
the defect in the buyer's goods is an isolated occurrence. Without
evidence that other buyers received defective goods, applying the
bar of the notice rule entails the risk that the seller may reap a wind-
fall because there is no possibility of other claims. Even if other
buyers assert claims, in many cases the seller could not have avoided
the subsequent liability even with earlier notice. Notice of defective
performance will not necessarily enable the seller to find and solve
the problem quickly. 121 Product defects that do not pose risks of
personal or serious property injury are less likely to prompt sellers
to undertake vigorous efforts to avoid similar liability to other buy-
ers. Recalls of goods already sold or extensive redesign efforts seem
especially unlikely.
Because the connection between timely notice and avoidance of
similar liability to other buyers is so tenuous, this rationale for the
notice rule suggests that it is preferable to limit application of the
rule, insofar as it is justified on the basis of this argument, to cases in
which the seller has delivered similarly defective goods to other buy-
ers and would not have done so or would have recalled them had it
received earlier notice. Unless justified by another rationale, apply-
ing the notice rule when there is no such showing of probable preju-
dice would significantly overprotect the seller. If the rule is limited
in this way, it will probably shield a seller from liability for defective
products only in a small number of cases.
D. Summary of Prejudice Arguments
The prejudice arguments provide a reasonable justification for
the notice rule if a buyer's delay in giving notice causes the seller
prejudice. None of the potential types of prejudice, however, are
likely to occur in all or even most types of sellers' breach cases.
Moreover, the notice rule's complete bar will often bar more of the
buyer's claim than the potential or actual prejudice warrants.
The strongest prejudice argument is the seller's loss of claims
pointed users [no tort recovery] ... and the endangered ones [tort recovery allowed]");
cf. Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 327-29
(Alaska 1981) (discussing cases allowing tort recovery for all damages suffered in "sud-
den and calamitous" occurrence).
121 The problem may take lengthy study to diagnose and cure. Buyer's delay in giv-
ing notice does not necessarily affect the seller's ability to avoid similar liability to others
if the seller cannot easily cure the defect. Earlier notice by buyers might stimulate the
seller to make greater efforts to solve the technical problems, convince the seller that the
harm caused by the potentially defective good is so great that the seller does not deliver
any more goods of the same kind, or even convince the seller to recall all similar goods.
On the other hand, notice alone may have little effect on the seller. Perhaps only a
lawsuit would persuade the seller to pull its goods off the market, redesign them, or at
least fix them.
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against third parties because of a "gap" in the applicable limitations
periods. In many cases, however, sellers could not pass on liability
even with earlier notice from the buyer. Loss of opportunity to
avoid costs by cure presents a concrete claim of prejudice, but will
rarely account for the buyer's entire claim. That the buyer's delay in
notice may in some situations deny the seller the opportunity to
avoid similar liability to other buyers is plausible, but the argument
indulges in considerable speculation. The evidence-gathering ra-
tionale is the most tenuous prejudice justification for the notice
rules. Even in those cases that best fit the argument, a rebuttable
presumption that the lost evidence favored the seller would be fairer
then the notice rule's bar. Thus, prejudice to the seller, the strong-
est policy supporting the notice rule, cannot justify the rule in its
present form.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF CRITIQUE FOR APPLICATION OF
STATUTORY AND CONTRACTUAL NOTICE RULES
The foregoing sections have concluded that the only reasonable
justification for the notice rule is protection of the seller against
prejudice. This conclusion calls for a number of changes in the way
courts interpret and apply current notice rules. This section will
first examine the statutory notice rule that applies in the absence of
party agreement to the contrary. The section then discusses the de-
gree of freedom that the parties should have to write their own no-
tice rule. Finally, this section considers whether the courts are free
to implement this Article's recommendations or whether legislative
reform is needed.
A. The Statutory Notice Rule
The conclusions of this Article suggest four areas of change in
the application of the statutory notice rule: (1) the content of notice
required; (2) the choice between a broadly applicable "limitations-
style" rule and a narrower "laches-style" rule; (3) the procedures
for applying the "laches-style" notice rule; and (4) the remedy em-
ployed to redress prejudice.
1. The Content of the Notice Required
The most unjustifiable excesses of the current notice rule result
from the prevailing view that the required notice is of the buyer's
opinion that the seller has breached. The only prejudice to sellers
that a notice rule can redress arises from the informational disad-
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vantage that sellers suffer upon delivery of goods to their buyers. 122
Because the informational disadvantage concerns only the factual
basis of claims that the goods do not conform to contract require-
ments, 23 the only notice that the rule should require the buyer to
give the seller is either notice of the factual basis for its claim of
breach or sufficient notice of the buyer's dissatisfaction so that the
seller knows that it may have breached. 24
A corollary of the minimal content rule is that the notice rule
should not apply at all in cases in which the seller knows of the fac-
tual basis for the buyer's claim.' 25 In those cases, the buyer's notice
122 Even the more expansive rationale of the repose argument would apply only to
cases involving the same informational disadvantage. See supra text accompanying note
60.
123 This point has already been argued with respect to the evidence-gathering ra-
tionale. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97. It is applicable to each of the other
prejudice arguments as well.
For example, if the seller knows that it has delivered goods with defective compo-
nents, the seller knows that it may face liability for the defect and knows enough to
assert liability against a component supplier if it believes that the supplier is responsible
for that liability. The seller can either initiate suit against the supplier and seek to join
the buyer to establish damages or secure the supplier's agreement to waive the limita-
tions period pending three-way settlement negotiations. Once a dispute has arisen, par-
ties can make binding agreements to extend the limitations period for a reasonable
amount of time for that dispute. See United States v. Curtis Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d
639, 641 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrs § 218
(1963). Similarly, knowledge of a defect in delivered goods affords the seller as much
opportunity to avoid liability to others for similar defects as notice would.
With regard to the prejudice argument based on cure and mitigation, mere knowl-
edge of the fact that the good does not conform to the warranties is also clearly sufficient
to protect the seller's interest in being able to offer cure if it is the lowest-cost source of
cure. The seller's interest in avoiding avoidable consequential damages may seem to
require knowledge of the damages claimed as well, but the seller is adequately protected
by the rule that a party cannot recover consequential damages unless they were foresee-
able at the time of contracting. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); cf.
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
249 (1975) (proposing to let the buyer recover damages the seller has reason to antici-
pate at the time of breach). See generally E. Farnsworth, supra note 6, § 12.14, at 876.
Under the mitigation doctrine the buyer cannot recover those damages if it would have
been commercially reasonable for the buyer to have sought cure from the seller or from
another source. See supra Section II.A.
124 Even courts adhering to the strict standard for the content of notice do not re-
quire the buyer to specify precisely the nature of the seller's breach. See Eastern Air
Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 976 (5th Cir. 1976). The buyer's
expression of discontent places the seller on notice for purposes of avoiding possible
prejudice as does knowledge about the precise way in which the seller has breached.
125 One case has reached this conclusion to penalize knowing misrepresentation.
United California Bank v. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 945, 960 (D.
Mass. 1982) (refusing to enforce U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) notice rule because seller knew of
nonconformity but misrepresented to buyer that goods conformed), aff'd, 705 F.2d 439
(Ist Cir. 1983). Similarly, the notice rule of the German Commercial Code does not
protect sellers that "concealed the defect in bad faith." HGB § 377(5) (translated supra
note 4).
But absent fraud, most cases in the United States permit the seller that knows of the
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would be a formality without function, and there would be nojustifi-
cation for applying the notice rule. The minimal content rule also
suggests, contrary to current interpretation of the notice rule,1 26
that the notice rule should exclude claims for delay in delivery as
does the German version of the rule.127
Adoption of the most lenient standard for the content of the
notice also requires rejection of the related views that (1) the buyer
does not give adequate notice if it adopts too conciliatory a tone
with the seller128 and (2) the buyer that continues to place new or-
ders with a seller without explicitly raising breach claims fails to give
notice.129 Sufficiency of the content of notice should be judged only
on whether the seller was given either knowledge of the factual basis
for the buyer's breach claim or reason to believe that it may have
breached. Factors affecting only the seller's evaluation of the
buyer's intention of pressing its claim are irrelevant.13 °
defect to gain the protection of the notice rule. The cases applying the strict standard
for the content of notice clearly require something more than seller knowledge of the
factual basis for a claim of breach, but even most of the cases applying the lenient stan-
dard might be understood to require some expression of buyer dissatisfaction. See supra
note 31. That requirement is not justified if the seller has clear knowledge that its goods
do not comply with the contractual requirements because the seller suffers no informa-
tional disadvantage. Application of the notice rule in such cases encourages seller be-
havior that borders on fraud.
The notice rule adopted in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods comes closer to adopting the view of this Article by
prohibiting the seller from invoking the notice rule to bar a claim that "relates to facts of
which he knew or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the
buyer." United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
art. 40, opened for signature April 11, 1980 [hereinafter CISG].
126 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
127 By its terms, section 377 of the German Commercial Code does not apply to
delay claims, but only to claims for "defects." See supra note 4 (quoting section 377 in
full). The notice provision adopted in the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of
Goods similarly applies only to claims based on "lack of conformity of the goods," CISG
art. 39, and appears to have been intended to exclude delay claims. See J. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
§ 256 (1982).
128 See Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 978 (5th Cir.
1976) (buyer's conduct "taken as a whole" must indicate that seller is in breach); Kopper
Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 97 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (favorable
reports about product greatly outnumbered complaints, thereby failing to provide
proper notice of breach).
129 See Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 979 (factor showing failure to fulfill notice re-
quirement was fact that buyer "continued to negotiate new contracts and amend old
ones throughout the period in which the delays occurred"); Marshwood Prods. Co. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 224, 240 N.W. 392, 398 (1932) (notice under
Uniform Sales Act not properly given where plaintiff ordered same product without
complaint for 20 months).
I 3o Such factors are relevant only if the seller makes out a prima facie case for equi-
table or promissory estoppel. The seller would have to show that the buyer represented
either that it had no breach claim (equitable estoppel) or that it would not press its
breach claim (promissory estoppel) knowing that the seller would rely on that statement.
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2. Broad Versus Narrow Rule
The first reason to discard the dominant interpretation of the
current notice rule to bar the buyer's entire claim in every case in
which the buyer delays notice unreasonably is that the buyer's delay
does not harm the seller in the full amount of the claim in many
cases. The buyer's delay may prejudice a seller by depriving it of an
opportunity to offer cure, but the harm to the seller will hardly ever
equal the buyer's whole claim. The loss-of-evidence argument does
not even justify barring damages. The only kinds of prejudice likely
to cause harm to the seller in the magnitude of the buyer's claim are
restricted to rather narrow categories, principally the loss of specific
claims against suppliers and the loss of the opportunity to avoid
similar liability to other buyers of mass-produced goods. Many
cases will not present either of these types of prejudice; the latter in
particular seems very speculative in most cases.
The second reason to discard the broad form of the rule is that
the possible types of prejudice do not collectively cover all or even
most of the possible seller's breach cases. In fact, there are few re-
ported cases which have applied the bar of the notice rule in circum-
stances that are dearly justified by prejudice to the seller.13 1 The
current majority interpretation of the notice rule as a "limitations-
style" rule therefore is grievously overboard with respect to the only
sound rationale for the rule. A "laches-style" rule that requires a
showing of prejudice as a condition to invoking the rule's special
Most importantly, the seller would have to show that it did rely on that statement to its
detriment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (promissory estoppel;
adding requirement that injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise);
id. § 84 comment b (equitable estoppel protects "reliance on a misrepresentation of an
existing fact").
131 The clearest examples involve consequential damages which could have been
avoided or cases in which changes in the goods during the delay deprives the seller of
the opportunity to verify the alleged defect. See, e.g., McCune v. F. Alioto Fish Co., 597
F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1979) (design defect buyer should have discovered during three
years of use led to loss of entire vessel; notice would have permitted seller to cure and
therefore lack of notice properly bars claim for loss of vessel); Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. Air
Door, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 804, 278 S.E.2d 708 (1981) (buyer of steel grating and frame
which allegedly did not fit together properly upon delivery ground away rim of frame
before notifying seller); Hepper v. Triple U Enters., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525 (S.D. 1986)
(year's delay in notifying seller of brucellosis in buffalo prevented ascertainment of de-
gree of infection of herd at time of sale).
There are surprisingly few of these cases among the reported decisions though un-
doubtedly this is in part due to the lack of a formal requirement under the current rule
that the court find prejudice before applying the notice rule bar. A few decisions assert
that the buyer's delay prejudiced the seller but fail to give any details to back up that
assertion other than the general dimming of witnesses' memories. See, e.g., Smith-Moore
Body Co. v. Heil Co., 603 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1985); Begley v. Jeep Corp., 491 F.
Supp. 63 (W.D. Va. 1980). The statute of limitations, not the notice rule, should be
used to protect against such generalized claims of prejudice. See supra Section III.B. 1.
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protection would insure that the rule would apply only when justi-
fied by rationale.
Supporters of the current interpretation of the notice rule may
object that a "laches-style" rule that adds the complex prejudice is-
sue for litigation is likely to increase litigation costs and impose on
sellers the risk of failing to prove prejudice that they actually suffer
as a result of the buyer's delay. These are potentially serious objec-
tions. A rule that overprotects sellers by cutting off some valid
claims for no reason may be better for both buyers and sellers than a
more complex rule that creates more litigation and fails to protect
sellers adequately.
These objections, however, are not persuasive for a number of
reasons. The current broad rule so poorly fits the prejudice ration-
ale that in many cases it is an empty formalism, an unfair "booby-
trap" with no function other than to disadvantage buyers. 132 Sec-
ond, the costs of the "laches" rule will not be substantially greater
than the costs of the current rule. Even if courts do not require
proof of prejudice, the prejudice issue is already present in much
litigation: lawyers arguing for the notice rule's bar have long under-
stood the desirability of showing prejudice. 133 Moreover, the costs
and risks to sellers of litigating the prejudice issue can be limited by
requiring a showing, not of actual prejudice, but only of the likeli-
hood of prejudice. As explained in detail in subsection 3 below, the
proposal here is to require only a showing that a reasonable basis
exists to believe that the delay in notice caused prejudice to the
seller.
Finally, giving full effect to the rejection of short limitations pe-
riods implicit in the Article 2 statute of limitations requires adoption
of the narrowest conception of the notice rule. Section 2-725 repre-
sents a decision to favor protection of buyers' damage remedies
over the possible benefits to sellers from a statutory rule of repose
of less than four years or contractual cut-off periods of less than one
year.' 3 4 The only way to ensure that the notice rule does not under-
mine those policy choices is to require proof that the buyer's delay
in giving notice has or will likely cause the seller prejudice.
132 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
133 Many decisions applying the notice rule bar take care to point out how the
buyer's delay apparently prejudiced the seller. See, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 826 (6th Cir. 1978) (making particularly tenuous prejudice
argument; see supra note 101), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Professors White and
Summers expressly encourage sellers' counsel to make the argument. J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-10, at 421 ("A lawyer cognizant of the policies behind the
notice requirement... may be able to argue convincingly that a specific time was or was
not reasonable in light of those policies [behind the notice rule].").
134 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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3. Procedures for Applying the Notice Rule
If the notice rule applies only upon a showing of prejudice, the
procedures that courts currently use in applying the rule should be
reversed. Instead of presuming that the notice rule applies and put-
ting the burdens of pleading and proving compliance with the no-
tice rule on the buyer, as courts currently do,135 the seller should be
required to plead the applicability of the notice rule and to carry the
burdens of both going forward with the evidence and persuasion
that the seller likely suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in
notice.' 36 If the seller carries those burdens, then the buyer would
have to carry the burden of proving that it gave notice within a rea-
sonable time, as under current law.' 37
How much of a showing of prejudice should the seller have to
make? If the rule is to protect sellers at all and not unduly increase
litigation costs, it cannot require the seller to prove too much. For
example, a seller that can show he lost a claim against a supplier as a
result of the buyer's delay in giving notice has lost at least the settle-
ment value of its claim. Hence, the seller should not have to prove
the claim it alleges it lost against a third party by a preponderance of
the evidence. Factual and legal grounds for a claim against the third
party sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion should suf-
fice.' 38 Similarly, the seller claiming the prejudice of lost opportu-
nity to avoid similar liability to other buyers should have to
135 The courts early established under section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act that the
notice requirement was a condition precedent to the buyer's right to recovery and that
the buyer therefore must plead and prove the timely giving of notice as part of its action
for breach. Regina Co. v. Gately Furniture Co., 171 A.D. 817, 821, 157 N.Y.S. 746, 749
(N.Y. App. Div. 1916); Schram v. Guttenberg, 198 N.Y.S. 209, 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923);
Rothenberg v. Shapiro, 140 N.Y.S. 148, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1913); Hutchinson v. Ren-
ner, 28 Ohio App. 22, 27, 162 N.E. 451, 452 (1928).
The rule is the same today. Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134,
153 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Ohio law); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co.,
587 F.2d 813, 823 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Ohio law), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892, 895 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (applying New York law). See generally Clark, supra note 5, at 114-15.
136 It makes sense to put the burdens of pleading and persuasion with regard to the
prejudice issue on the seller because the notice rule operates solely for the seller's bene-
fit and the seller is far more likely to have access to the evidence of prejudice than the
buyer.
137 See supra note 135. The current allocation of these burdens to the buyer on the
issue of timeliness of notice makes sense for the same reasons that justify allocating the
burdens on the prejudice issue to the seller. The timeliness issue should be decided
primarily on the basis of the nature and context of the buyer's business and of the
breach in question, and most of the evidence relevant to these issues will be in the hands
of the buyer.
138 The seller should not be permitted to make this argument with respect to causes
of action against suppliers in any jurisdiction that treats the seller's claim against a sup-
plier as an indemnity claim that does not even accrue until the seller itself is adjudged
liable for the supplier's breach. See supra text accompanying note 126.
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demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that it has actual liability
to another buyer that the seller could have avoided had it received
earlier notice.139
For the more easily confirmed claim in which the seller alleges
that, but for the buyer's delay in notice, the seller could have pre-
vented some of the buyer's damages by offering cure, the rule
should require more concrete proof. The seller should have to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the buyer reasonably
should have known that the seller was in a position to offer cure and
that the cure could have avoided part of the damages claimed by the
buyer.
As suggested earlier, the difficulty of formulating an appropri-
ate standard for the requisite showing of the prejudice of loss of
evidence is eliminated by employing, instead of a complete bar, the
much less drastic remedy of a rebuttable presumption that the lost
evidence would have favored the seller. Therefore, all the seller
should have to show is that the buyer's delay caused the loss of a
specific source of evidence concerning the conformity of the goods.
Section I of this Article suggests another important change in
the procedures currently used to apply the notice rule: pleadings in
a lawsuit should not be disqualified from constituting notice if they
otherwise meet the requirements of the rule.140 Contrary holdings,
especially those suggesting that the opportunity to give proper no-
tice is lost once a lawsuit is filed, 4 1 seem to drive to an extreme the
ill-advised attempt to justify the notice rule as a tool to promote
settlement.1 42
139 The rule would be too rigid if it required the seller to prove ajudgment against it
or payment of a settlement; a showing that another buyer has grounds for a claim suffi-
cient to withstand summary judgment should be sufficient. Nor should the seller have to
prove that it necessarily would have avoided the liability to the second buyer, but only
that had it received earlier notice, it would have had a realistic opportunity to avoid the
further liability.
140 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 33.
142 Rejection of settlement as a chief policy goal for the notice rule does not neces-
sarily mean that the rule should not be fashioned to encourage settlement, but there are
several reasons not to disqualify pleadings from fulfilling the notice rule.
First, as the discussion of the settlement rationale in Section L.A attempted to show,
there is no reason to believe that service of pleadings necessarily diminishes the chances
for settlement. Second, it would be particularly inappropriate to interpret a narrowly
conceived notice rule, like that advocated here, in this way. Under the form of the notice
rule suggested in the appendix, the notice rule would not apply in many cases. It would
seem especially arbitrary to penalize those buyers that are subject to the notice rule for
suing too quickly while leaving the rest free to sue first and negotiate later. Unless the
policy of requiring disputants to attempt negotiations before being allowed to institute
suit is strong enough to be applied to all civil disputants, there is no reason to interpret
the notice rule to have that effect in the limited cases to which it applies.
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4. Remedies for Lack of Notice
The strongest justification for the notice rule is that it over-
comes actual or reasonably likely prejudice to the seller. Even in
those cases where there is prejudice, however, it may be so slight
that an absolute bar is too harsh a remedy for lack of notice. The
notice rule should bar damages only to the extent necessary to over-
come prejudice.
For example, in the case of the seller denied an opportunity to
cure, the costs that the seller would have had an opportunity to
avoid had it received timely notice may be only a small portion of
the buyer's actual damages. 143 Loss of a claim against a supplier
seems more likely to affect the buyer's whole claim, but it would not
if the seller were responsible for some of the defects. Loss of rebut-
tal evidence also would seem to justify barring the buyer's entire
claim. As noted above, 144 however, a presumption can cure that
prejudice, so the harsh remedy of an absolute bar is not necessary.
Only where the seller loses the opportunity to avoid similar lia-
bility to other buyers is the prejudice likely to equal or exceed the
value of the buyer's claim. Thus, when it occurs, this type of preju-
dice may justify a flat bar. Nevertheless, to prevent too speculative
an application of this rationale for the notice rule the seller should
be required to prove a basis for actual claims by other buyers and
the bar should only apply to the extent of these claims. 145
B. Contractual Notice Rules
This Article proposes to restrict considerably the application of
the statutory notice rule. With this restriction, sellers will have a
stronger incentive to bargain for greater protection in an express
contractual notice rule; conversely, buyers may wish to contract out
of the rule altogether. Hence, it is important to ask whether any
reasons exist for restricting contracting parties' freedom to vary the
notice rule by contract.
Professors White and Summers have suggested that the notice
rule represents a fundamental Article 2 policy. They propose that
buyers should not be free to contract out of the notice rule even
143 This is especially likely to be true if the seller's claim of prejudice rests on its
assertion that it is the lowest-cost provider of cure. In that case, the extent of prejudice
to the seller is only the differential between the seller's costs of cure and the market cost,
not the full extent of the cost of cure.
144 See supra Section II.B.3.
145 The seller should not have to prove the exact amounts of its liability to other
buyers when the other buyers' claims are not finally determined by judgment or settle-
ment. For unliquidated claims, the bar should apply in an amount for which a reason-
able basis exists to believe that the seller may be liable.
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though the Code does not explicitly forbid the parties to do S0.146
Examination of the policies underlying the notice rule suggests the
contrary: far from representing fundamental policies, the notice
rule rests on relatively weak justifications. Although a notice rule
tailored to protect only against actual or likely prejudice can be ra-
tionalized as the best way of allocating the risks of those types of
prejudices between the parties, if the parties choose to allocate
more of these risks to the seller by eliminating the notice rule there
is no strong policy reason not to enforce that choice.147
On the other hand, if the parties choose to allocate more of the
risks to the buyer by an express contractual notice provision, the
situation is a bit more complex. The Code provides a partial guide.
Unlike the statutory rules, contractual notice provisions often spec-
ify the form of notice to be given, set a specific time period for no-
tice, or do both.148 The Code expressly invites parties to specify at
least the notice period, as long as the period chosen is not "mani-
festly unreasonable."' 149 Accordingly, courts generally enforce con-
146 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 3-10, at 137. I have found no cases
involving the enforceability of a contractual notice rule. The dearth of cases suggests
that buyers do not seek to contract out of the rule, perhaps because buyers generally
underestimate the risk that the notice rule poses for them and therefore are unwilling to
expend negotiation capital to eliminate the rule.
147 Only the mitigation principle suggests even a possible public policy that parties
should not be free to contradict by contract. Its role in serving the maximization ofjoint
post-breach wealth of the parties and its close connection to notions of causality suggest
its centrality to the values underlying the contracts remedies system. See supra note 79
and accompanying text; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 76, at 967 ("applications of the
mitigation principle pervade the specific rules of contract"). But eliminating the notice
rule would only eliminate one small aspect of the requirements of mitigation, not the
whole principle. Moreover, to the extent that courts enforce liquidated damages provi-
sions without regard to the amount of damages actually incurred, we permit some con-
tractual variation of the mitigation principle. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.18,
at 900-02 (generally, reasonableness of forecast of damages in liquidated damages
clause to be judged at time of contracting, not in light of damages actually incurred; split
of authority whether liquidated damages clause that was reasonable forecast at time of
contracting should be enforced if there are no damages at time of breach).
148 Cf TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 342 (5th Cir.
1980) (contractual notice rule for claims with respect to quality of flour required written
notice to be sent by registered letter within 10 days after discovery, but in any event
within 20 days after tender of delivery, together with sample of allegedly nonconforming
flour to be sent within 20-day period).
149 Section 1-204(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable
time, any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by
agreement.
To the extent that the notice rule is viewed as a requirement of good faith, as U.C.C.
§ 2-607 comment 4 suggests, section 1-102(3) of the Code would also be applicable:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not
be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
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tractual notice rules as written' 50 unless the specified time period is
so short that, in view of the nature of the goods and the breaches
involved, it would be unreasonable to-expect the buyer to have dis-
covered the breaches within the contractual time period.' 5 '
Analysis of possible justifications for the rule, however, sug-
gests one important way in which the current level of policing ex-
press contractual notice provisions is inadequate. Section 2-725(1)
expresses a strong public policy decision rejecting the weak plan-
ning benefits of repose periods shorter than one year in favor of
assuring claimants at least one year in which to exercise their rights
the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be mea-
sured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
150 See, e.g., Willis v. West Kentucky Feeder Pig Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d
899 (1971) (enforcing bar of contractual notice rule requiring notice of pigs' illness
within 7 days after delivery).
The waiver doctrine, however, has been applied to contractual notice requirements
because notice conditions are said to be "practically never a substantial part of the con-
sideration constituting the agreed equivalent of the promised performance of the other
party." 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 123, § 264, at 513 (1960). In particular, if the seller
responds to the buyer's claims within the contractually specified notice period without
raising the buyer's failure to give notice in the contractually required form, courts are
quick to find waiver of the form requirements. See, e.g., TJ. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193
Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (ongoing informal communications
and actions indicating that buyer though the seller was in breach constituted adequate
notice); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 255 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (seller's reassurances and promises to remedy problem and failure to mention
notice stopped seller from raising defense); Anderson v. Farmer's Hybrid Cos., 87 Ill.
App. 3d 493, 497, 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (1980) (seller's acknowledgement of problem
and offer of further assistance operated to waive contractual notice provision).
151 See, e.g., Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1215-17 (3d
Cir.) (15 day notice period manifestly unreasonable for defect claims concerning chemi-
cal contaminant in resin which could not be discovered until resin incorporated into
products and sold to and used by ultimate consumers), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970);
Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, 407 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (refusing to en-
force 120-day notice period against claims for latent defect in soybean inoculant); Wil-
son Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 107, 244
N.E.2d 685 (1968) (refusing on basis of U.C.C. section 2-719 to apply contractual re-
quirement that buyer's claims be made before processing of wool to bar claim for latent
defects which could not be discovered until after yarn was processed and finished prod-
uct washed).
-The decisions refusing to bar buyers' claims for latent defects that were not discov-
erable until after expiration of the contractual notice period have been criticized as up-
setting reasonable allocations between the parties of the risk of latent defects. See, e.g.,J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 12-10, at 468 (suggesting that such risk allocations
should be policed only under extraordinary standard of unconscionability). Surely
within limits businesses should be free to allocate the risk of latent defects as they see fit.
Therefore, the fact that a defect could first be discovered only after expiration of the
contractual notice period should not per se render the notice rule invalid. But uncon-
scionability need not be the only limit on contractual allocation of the risk of latent
defects. At least some of the cases may be understood as refusing to enforce contractual
notice periods so short that they effectively operate as "booby-traps" to foreclose buy-
ers' rights before they have a realistic opportunity to enforce them.
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to a remedy. 152 If that policy is sound, contractual notice provisions
that cut off buyer claims in less than one year solely for the purpose
of securing the benefits of repose should not be given effect. To
enforce a contractual notice period of less than one year, sellers
should have to show that the antiprejudice purpose of the rule is
served.
In specifying by contract notice periods of one year or more,
the parties should be free to adopt the most expansive basis for the
rule, namely securing to the seller the planning benefits of a shorter
limitations period. Because the parties are free to shorten contrac-
tually the limitations period itself to as little as one year, there can
be no objection to contractual notice provisions that have the same
effect. What constitutes a purpose that would permit the parties to
contract for a notice rule that cuts off claims in less than one year
depends largely on the strength of the policy against limitations pe-
riods of less than one year.
Sellers might, for example, justify a less-than-one-year notice
period by claiming to seek protection from the specific prejudices
against which the statutory notice rule justifiably shields the seller
and from avoidance of the substantial proof problems that this Arti-
cle's proposed notice rule would impose on the seller. In effect,
sellers could claim that contractual notice periods of less than one
year should be permitted to secure the benefits of a "limitations-
style" rule of more certain application.
Although this goal may seem reasonable, 53 enforcing such a
rule presents the possibility that the contractual notice rule will cut
off the buyer's claim even though the seller was not prejudiced. If
the one-year minimum represents strong public policy-and the
very existence of a minimum that parties cannot contract out of indi-
cates that it does-then sellers should not be permitted to circum-
vent that policy solely for the purpose of simplifying their proof
problems. This conclusion is especially warranted by substantial
152 See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
153 The use of a broad "limitations-style" contractual notice rule to protect the
seller against the burden of having to prove damages that the seller could have avoided
had it received notice in time to offer cure is subject to the objection that the absolute
bar imposed by the rule would very likely have no reasonable relationship to the preju-
dice actually suffered by the seller. One might therefore object to the broad form of the
rule on the grounds that it would be a type of contractual penalty. See generally E. FARNS-
woRTH, supra note 6, § 12.18. The soundness of our disinclination to enforce contrac-
tual penalties, however, is debated. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977) (arguing that the rule against enforcement of
penalties should be abandoned and that liquidated damages provisions should be po-
liced only by unconscionability doctrine).
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doubt that sellers in general suffer prejudice as a result of the
buyer's delay in giving notice.
For several reasons, the one-year minimum should be inter-
preted as a strong public policy decision that warrants restrictions
on contractual notice rules. First, courts historically have been in-
imical to very short limitations periods. Long before the enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code with the one-year minimum limi-
tation period for sale of goods, courts would not generally enforce
unreasonably short contractual limitations periods.' 54 Similarly, the
Code permits contracting parties to stipulate a set period of time in
which notice must be given to satisfy the notice rule as long as that
period is not "manifestly unreasonable."' 155 The relevant official
comment explains that "provision is made for disregarding a clause
which whether by inadvertence pr overreaching fixes a time so un-
reasonable that it amounts to eliminating all remedy under the con-
tract."15 6 Thus the drafters of the Code recognized that too short a
cut-off period could in effect "eliminate" remedies whether the cut-
off was a notice rule or a statute of limitations.
Second, the Code manifests a strong policy of ensuring parties
meaningful remedies for contract rights. Section 2-719(2), for ex-
ample, provides a buyer with all the normal remedies for breach
154 See, e.g., Herman v. Northwest Airlines, 222 F.2d 326, 328 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.)
(contractual limitations period for suits by passengers against common carriers must be
reasonable), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955); Page County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 205
Iowa 798, 800, 216 N.W. 957, 958 (1927) (refusing to enforce contractual provision
requiring suit on surety bond to be instituted between 60 and 90 days after default);
South & Cent. Am. Commercial Co. v. Panama R.R., 237 N.Y. 287, 142 N.E. 666 (1928)
(Cardozo, J.) (refusing to enforce term in bill of lading requiring notice of claim within
60 days and suit within 60 days thereafter; court regarded recent federal legislation not
strictly applicable that prohibited notice rules and set 2-year minimum limitations pe-
riod for certain bills of lading as setting standard of reasonableness). The rule outside
of Article 2 is still the same. See Camelot Excavating v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 118,
301 N.W.2d 275 (1981).
This Article does not contend here that the courts uniformly found relatively short
time periods to be unreasonable, cf Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22
(1922) (30-day notice provision upheld); The Finland, 35 F.2d 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)
(same), but only that they generally recognized a minimal requirement of reasonable-
ness. As Justice Cardozo's opinion in Panama R.R. reflects, some legislation also showed
a concern to regulate very short notice and limitations periods. The Michigan Supreme
Court has laid down as guidelines for the determination of reasonableness that
[t]he boundaries of what is reasonable under the general rule require that
the claimant have sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action,
that the time not be so short as to work a practical abrogation of the right
of action, and that the action not be barred before the loss or damage can
be ascertained.
Camelot Excavating, 410 Mich. at 127, 301 N.W.2d at 277. A number of states have car-
ried the policy in favor of protecting claimants' rights so far that they have forbidden
contractual shortening of the limitations period applicable to sales. See supra note 66.
155 See supra note 149.
156 U.C.C. § 1-204 comment 1.
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when an exclusive or limited remedy "fail[s] of its essential pur-
pose," and section 2-719(3) voids contractual limitations on conse-
quential damages if the limitation or exclusion is
"unconscionable."' 57 The obvious policy in each of these provi-
sions is to prevent sellers from using sales contracts to lure con-
tracting parties into agreements with illusory rights. Although the
Code does not entirely eliminate caveat emptor, s58 to the extent
that the seller makes any warranties, the Code requires that the
buyer must be given a meaningful remedy for breach and some min-
imum time in which to exercise the right to a remedy. Failure to
protect buyers in this manner would result in a much more insidious
form of caveat emptor than the total absence of any warranties.
For these reasons, this Article's proposed notice rule would ap-
ply the same procedures for pleading and proof to contractual no-
tice periods of less than one year as it would apply to the statutory
notice rule. Contractual notice periods of one year or more would
be enforceable unless manifestly unreasonable in view of the specific
goods and the specific breaches involved. To enforce shorter con-
tractual notice periods, the seller should have to show, as under the
statutory notice rule, that it likely suffered prejudice by reason of the
buyer's delay.159
C. Need for Statutory Reform
Courts can implement many of the proposed changes in the ap-
plication of the statutory and contractual notice rules without legis-
157 Id. § 2-719.
158 The Code allows sellers to disclaim warranties. Section 2-316(2) permits dis-
claiming both of the implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular
purpose as long as the form requirements of that section are met. The implied warranty
of merchantability can even be disclaimed orally as long as the word "merchantability"
is used. Section 2-316(3)(a) makes it even easier for the seller to disclaim implied war-
ranties by using special disclaimer language like "as is" or "with all faults." Warranties
of title and against infringement can likewise be excluded as long as the exclusion uses
"specific language" or the circumstances clearly indicate to the buyer that the seller does
not make those warranties. Id § 2-312(2).
159 See supra Section III.A.3.
The proposal is consistent with the modern trend in interpreting notice provisions,
presentment-of-claims clauses, and similar timeliness provisions in insurance contracts.
Courts are increasingly refusing to find insurance coverage barred for failure to give
notice of a claim in the manner and within the time prescribed by express insurance
contract clause unless the insurer shows that the delay prejudiced or at least likely
prejudiced it. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 NJ. 86, 237 A.2d
870 (1968); Great American Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d
769 (1981) (discussing cases manifesting trend toward requiring proof of prejudice); A
& W Artesian Well Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 463 A.2d 1381 (R.I. 1983). See
generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 7.2 (forthcoming 1988); Note, Com-
mercial Law---Great American Insurance Co. v. C.G. Tate Construction Co.: Interpretation
of Notice Provisions in Insurance Contracts, 61 N.C.L. REv. 167 (1982) (authored by Henry
Ralston).
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lative reform of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code does not
specify the content of the notice required, leaving the courts to de-
cide what standard to apply. 160 Therefore, within the loose stric-
tures of stare decisis, state courts are free to choose the minimal
standard. Holding, as one court has, that the notice rule does not
apply to delay claims in general, 16 1 also does not raise any signifi-
cant conflict with the legislature because that interpretation follows
from adoption of the minimal standard for content of notice. Simi-
larly, the Code leaves open the allocations of burdens of pleading
and proof on the notice issue.
With regard to this Article's two central proposals-(1) requir-
ing a showing of prejudice and (2) limiting the bar to the extent
necessary to overcome the prejudice shown-the courts may not be
as free to change the law in the absence of legislative authorization.
The first proposal is arguably within the power of the court, but sim-
ilar argument for the second proposal is more tenuous.
The language of the Code's notice rule neither explicitly sup-
ports nor refutes an interpretation requiring a showing of prejudice.
Many courts have in effect interpreted the "reasonable time" stan-
dard of the rule to reflect a rough balance of the interests of the
buyer in obtaining a remedy against the interests served by the no-
tice rule. 162 Because the legislatures have not provided any gui-
dance on the policy goals underlying the notice rule, the courts are
free to construe them as broadly or narrowly as they think proper.
An interpretation requiring a showing of prejudice is merely an-
other way of striking the balance.
The second proposal raises more of a problem because the no-
tice rule has never been thought of as imposing anything other than
an absolute bar in the cases to which it applies. How can a court
justify converting the absolute bar into a pro tanto cut-off? Several
possible answers are available, but none of them entirely solves the
problem.
The prejudice least likely to justify barring all of the buyer's
claim is loss of opportunity to cure. When the seller demonstrates
such a loss, the court might use the mitigation principle to justify
barring only the costs that the seller could have avoided. The court
could hold that the mitigation principle adequately protects the
seller against the prejudice of being held liable for breach costs that
the buyer could have avoided by acting reasonably and that, thus,
application of the notice rule for this purpose is an unnecessary du-
160 See supra note 31.
161 See supra note 32.
162 See supra note 36.
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plication of function. 63
The proposal that courts should employ presumptions to rem-
edy loss of the opportunity to gather rebuttal evidence is subject to
the strongest objection on the grounds of legislative preemption.
The chief prejudice argument advanced by courts to justify and
guide their application of the rule under the Uniform Sales Act was
the possibility that the seller would lose rebuttal evidence because
of the buyer's delay in giving notice.164 Thus, it seems likely that in
enacting the notice rule in the Uniform Commercial Code the legis-
latures were adopting the view that the absolute bar of the notice
rule is justified at least in cases in which the seller loses an opportu-
nity to gather significant evidence.
The best response to this argument is that the rule has no prej-
udice to remedy if the seller is given the benefit of a presumption.
Where not expressly limited by the legislature, courts have inherent
power to employ presumptions and burdens of proof.1 65 Tradition-
ally, courts place the burden of production of evidence on the party
with best access to the relevant evidence.' 66 Courts should also be
free to employ presumptions to prevent the careless or deliberate
behavior of one litigant from prejudicing the opposing litigants' de-
fense or prosecution. t67 Nevertheless, to eliminate any doubt on
this point, state legislatures should amend section 2-607(3)(a) to au-
thorize courts to overcome prejudice through means less drastic
than a complete bar.t68
163 The mitigation principle itself, however, probably does not protect the seller that
is in fact the lowest-cost provider of cure if the buyer does not reasonably know that the
seller is or may be the lowest-cost provider. See supra text following note 84.
164 See supra note 41.
165 Courts do this so often it arouses no comment. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (shifting burden on personal jurisdiction issue
from plaintiff to defendant "who purposefully has directed his activities at forum resi-
dents"). That courts cannot avoid doing so follows from the observation that "the legal
rules of entitlement and responsibility form not a system of absolute rules, but rather a
system of presumptions." Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 556,
582 (1973).
166 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 950 (3d ed. 1984). But "[tjhis
consideration should not be overemphasized." Id.
167 The fact that the absolute bar of the notice rule has commonly been justified on
the grounds that it protects against loss of evidence arguably shows that the rule was
intended to have a broader prophylactic function, and not to be limited to cases in which
actual prejudice could be shown. But if courts reject that view, as urged here, in recog-
nition that the assumed prejudice is not so prevalent or clear, then it would not make
sense to apply the rule as an absolute bar if a lesser remedy could adequately overcome
the prejudice.
168 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (in case of breach of
promise made binding by promissory estoppel).
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CONCLUSION
By applying the section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule broadly to all
buyers' damage claims, courts have made the rule a mere "booby-
trap" that introduces a large measure of sport into many breach
cases against sellers. This would be an unjust criticism of the rule if
there were a broadly applicable satisfactory justification for the rule,
but there is not. The strongest argument that would apply to all
cases is the repose argument, but it is not very compelling and, in
any event, conflicts with the Code's general policies disfavoring
quick repose.
The notice rule is needed, if at all, to protect sellers against
potential prejudice. A broadly applicable notice rule might be war-
ranted if the likelihood of prejudice were substantial in a sufficiently
large proportion of cases. Careful examination of the possible kinds
of prejudice, however, shows that the most likely types of prejudice
are neither particularly prevalent nor dear. A broad prophylactic
rule is therefore far too blunt an instrument for protection against
prejudice. Enforcement of the notice rule where no prejudice is
shown is significantly at odds with the Article 2 policies on limitation
periods. The statutory notice rules, as well as express contract no-
tice periods of less than one year, should therefore be restricted to
cases in which sellers can show a reasonable likelihood that the buy-
ers' delay has caused them prejudice.
This Article's proposed notice rule may seem to create complex
issues for litigation where none existed before, thereby threatening
to render the rule virtually useless for achieving any reasonable
measure of seller protection. The appearance is misleading. Be-
cause the "reasonable time" standard grants wide discretion to the
courts and because showing prejudice is regarded as a good way to
influence that discretion in favor of barring the claim, the existing
statutory notice rule raises the same complex issues as does the pro-
posed rule.' 69 Thus, the proposed form of the rule does not add
complex issues, but provides better guidance to courts and counsel
in addressing issues already present. Moreover, requiring the seller
to prove prejudice eliminates the unpredictable issue of the buyer's
timeliness in cases in which the seller has no evidence of
prejudice.170
169 See supra note 133.
170 The proposed rule should also produce more consistent decisions on the timeli-
ness issue because that issue would be addressed solely to the question of whether the
buyer acted reasonably in failing to discover the defect and give notice earlier. Under
current law, the timeliness issue is confused with the issue of whether the notice rule
should apply at all, see supra notes 36 & 133, but under the proposed rule, whether the
rule should apply would be decided first in evaluating the seller's evidence of prejudice.
The issue of timeliness would concentrate on how quickly a business of the size, corn-
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Application of the foregoing analysis to express contractual no-
tice rules depends heavily on the perception that Article 2 bespeaks
a strong public policy against short cut-off rules. It seems clear that
it does and that the policy is relevant to contractual notice rules, as
well as to contractual limitations periods. In particular, the one-year
minimum for contractual limitation periods established in section 2-
725(1) is explicable only as a policy decision not to permit very
short cut-off rules to frustrate the exercise of rights apparently
granted by contract. Perhaps very short cut-off periods are a partic-
ularly troublesome form of caveat emptor because they introduce
such an obvious sporting element into the contracts remedies
system.
Recognition of the policy's relevance to notice rules may call
into question whether the Code's minimum time rule needs revi-
sion. Perhaps it needs strengthening in favor of the buyer. One
alternative is to ensure that buyers have a realistic opportunity to
vindicate their rights under contractual warranties by preventing the
imposition of a very short notice period under any circumstances.
At least one state appears to have adopted that view. 17 1 Such a rule,
however, defeats the notice rule's purpose of protecting the seller
from prejudice that arises in some cases from even very short peri-
ods of delay. A better accommodation of the policies behind notice
rules and minimum limitations periods is the one advanced here.
Where the notice rule clearly functions to protect the seller from
likely prejudice, the policy of protecting the seller should outweigh
the policy of protecting the buyer; 172 if the seller cannot show likely
prejudice then the policy of preventing complete frustration of the
buyer's rights for the minimum period should be paramount.
Perhaps the minimum cut-off policy needs relaxing in favor of
sellers. A one-year minimum limitations period may be too long
when business buyers are involved. There is no reason that the min-
imum limitations period and the minimum notice period have to be
identical, but state legislatures, not courts, should make the policy
decision whether to make a distinction. At least one state legislature
has adopted a shorter minimum for the notice period than for the
limitations period, 73 presumably on the ground that it is less bur-
plexity, and sophistication of the buyer could reasonably be expected to inspect, detect,
and report defects of the kind and apparent seriousness of the defects at issue.
171 See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN § 16.071(a) (Vernon 1986) ("A stipulation
that requires notification within less than 90 days is void.").
172 Cf. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 2-318 (1984) (requiring showing of prejudice before
notice rule will bar recovery against nonprivity seller).
173 Compare TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN § 16.071(a) (Vernon 1986) (voiding
less-than-90-day notice stipulation) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(l) (Ver-
non 1968) (one year minimum for contractual limitations periods for sales of goods).
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densome for the buyer to comply with a short notice rule than with a
short limitations rule.
This Article has not attempted to determine the best choice for
these minimum time periods. The choice will inevitably be some-
what arbitrary. As long as the only minimum specified by the legis-
lature is the one-year rule for contractual limitations periods, it
ought to be taken as a limitation as well on contractual notice rules
that require no showing of prejudice because the notice rule is as
final a cut-off rule as the statute of limitations. Whatever the opti-
mal set of minimum time periods may be, the policy judgments un-
derlying the statutory limitations and notice rules should be
coordinated. Although notice rules protect important seller inter-
ests in certain cases, the courts and legislatures should be more hos-
tile than they have been to both statutory and contractual notice
rules that are employed where no discernible need to protect the
seller is present. The restricted form of the notice rule advocated
here would limit the rule to its proper functions and ensure that it
does not operate as a mere "booby-trap."
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED REINTERPRETATION OF NOTICE OF CLAIMS RULE CAST IN
FORM OF AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE
Note: Language from the current statute that is to be deleted is en-
closed in brackets; language to be added is italicized.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO U.C.C. § 2-607(3)
(3) Where a tender has been accepted,
[(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discov-
ers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy;]
(a) to the extent that the seller shows that he likely suffered prejudice
as a result of the buyer's delay in giving notice and the court determines that the
prejudice cannot be overcome by some less drastic means, the buyer is barred
from any remedy for breach of warranty (pursuant to Sections 2-312 through
2-315) if the buyer does not show that he gave the seller notice of the lack of
conformity within a reasonable time after he discovered it or ought to have
discovered it; and [the current subpart (b) would follow unchanged].
(7) Express contractual agreements fidng the reasonable time for giving
notice or relieving the seller from the requirement to show prejudice in order to
invoke the protection of the notice rule in subsection (3)(a) above are enforcea-
ble to the extent the contractual notice requirement does not purport, either as
written or as applied, to cut off the buyer's rights in less than one year, but no
contractual agreement requiring the giving of notice in less than one year after
acceptance shall be enforced unless the seller makes the showing of prejudice
required under subsection (3)(a) above.
PROPOSED OFFICIAL COMMENTS TO REPLACE OFFICIAL
COMMENT 4 TO U.C.C. § 2-607
4a. The purpose of the notice requirement in subsection
(3)(a) is to protect the seller from prejudice that the seller might
suffer as a result of the buyer's unreasonable delay in asserting a
claim for money damages after acceptance of the goods. There are
several different types of prejudice which the seller might suffer as a
result of the buyer's unreasonable delay. For example, the buyer
may have incurred damages as a result of the seller's breach which
the seller could have avoided had he received timely notice by offer-
ing to cure. In accordance with the rule against recovery of avoida-
ble damages, the notice rule would bar recovery of those damages
that the buyer could have avoided by giving timely notice.
Similarly, the seller may be prejudiced if the buyer's notice
comes too late for the seller to institute suit before expiration of the
limitations period applicable to the seller's suit against a third
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party-typically a supplier or carrier-who may be liable to the
seller for all or part of the seller's liability to the buyer. The notice
rule bars the buyer's recovery of those damages that the seller more
likely than not could have passed on to the third party if the buyer
had given timely notice.
Delay in notification to the seller may also deprive the seller of
an opportunity to avoid similar liability to other buyers by detecting
and correcting a defect in design, manufacture, or handling of simi-
lar goods. In this case, if the entire extent of the liability to the
seller is known, the buyer's damages should be reduced by that
amount, but not below zero. However, if the full extent of liability
to others is not known, as often may be the case, the only possible
remedy is to bar the buyer's entire claim for damages.
Finally, delay in giving the seller notice may prejudice the
seller's ability to defend against unfounded or fraudulent claims by
preventing the seller from obtaining or preserving a significant
source of evidence that might have shown the buyer's claim of non-
conformity to be unfounded. However, prejudice of this kind can
usually be overcome by giving the seller the benefit of a presump-
tion that the lost evidence would have been favorable to his defense.
4b. The seller is entitled to the protection of the notice rule
only if he is reasonably likely to have been prejudiced by delay in
notice. If the seller has notice of the nonconformity itself, even
though the buyer may not have indicated what legal position she
intends to take with respect to the nonconformity, the seller has suf-
ficient information to know that he should be concerned about the
possibility of any of the aforementioned types of prejudice. There-
fore, the notice rule should not apply to protect a seller who has
actual knowledge of the nonconformity even through the buyer has
given no notice. For this reason, the notice rule does not usually
apply to buyers' claims for delay in delivery.
4c. Because the notice rule is for the protection of the seller,
the seller should have to invoke it by pleading it and by carrying the
burdens of producing evidence and persuasion on the issue of the
extent to which the delay in notice caused prejudice to the seller.
4d. Even if the seller has likely suffered prejudice as a result of
delay in the buyer's giving notice of the nonconformity, the notice
rule does not cut off any part of the buyer's damage claim if the
buyer in fact discovered the nonconformity and gave notice within a
reasonable time. The reasonableness of the buyer's actions in this
regard is to be judged in the context of a reasonable buyer in the
particular situation of the actual buyer in question. More exacting
standards for promptness of inspection and the giving of notice are
to be applied to merchants than to consumers. Due consideration is
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to be given to the apparent seriousness of the nonconformity, as it
reasonably appeared to the buyer upon discovery.
PROPOSED NEW OFFICIAL COMMENT 9 TO U.C.C. § 2-607
9. Subsection (7) is added to make it clear that for notice peri-
ods of less than one year the parties are not free to contract out of
the requirement that sellers demonstrate the likelihood of prejudice
before they are entitled to invoke the notice rule to bar a buyer's
claim. This rule is necessary to prevent the parties from circum-
venting the Section 2-725(1) prohibition on limitations periods
shorter than one year.
